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When a person uses the traditional wireline telephone network to call another
person on his cell phone, the fixed network must transfer the call to the mobile
network to which the recipient subscribes. The fixed network provides originating
access for the call, and the mobile network provides terminating access. This
paper provides an economic analysis of the regulation of fixed-to-mobile
termination rates. Mobile party pays ("MPP") creates better incentives than
calling party pays ("CPP") for mobile network operators to place downward
pressure on termination rates. Cellular telephone use in the United States and
Canada has continued to increase at a significant pace despite the MPP regime
and now far exceeds mobile telephone use in countries with CPP regimes.
Multiple factors, including substitution possibilities for the callers of mobile
subscribers, constrain the market power of mobile operators in setting mobile
termination rates under CPP regimes. It is unrealistic for regulators to attempt to
set mobile rates, including termination rates, at marginal cost. If large fixed
network costs and customer acquisition costs must be recovered from variable
charges, then marginal-cost-based pricing is not feasible. Also, the value to
callers of being able to reach mobile subscribers justifies mobile termination
charges that exceed marginal cost because of network externalities in mobile
telecommunications. Finally, mobile termination rates that exceed marginal cost
(or its proxy, long-run average incremental cost) are consistent with Ramsey
(quasi-efficient) pricing. To the extent that high termination rates are a problem
in countries that have embraced CPP, it is because customers are poorly informed
of the charges they pay for their terminating calls. Consumer education would
solve the potential market failure without the need to impose price regulation on
otherwise competitive markets.
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Introduction
When a person uses the traditional wireline telephone network to call
another person on his cell phone, the fixed network must transfer the call
to the mobile network to which the recipient subscribes. The fixed network
provides originating access for the call, and the mobile network provides
terminating access. In the United States, the recipient pays for mobile
termination-an arrangement called "mobile party pays," or MPP. Other
countries, however, employ "calling party pays," or CPP.' The person
calling from the fixed network will not necessarily know beforehand the
identity of the mobile carrier that will be terminating his call, and thus
under CPP the caller will not necessarily know the price that he will be
charged for fixed-to-mobile termination. As a consequence, a policy
debate has arisen over whether a market failure exists, because it is alleged
that competitive forces do not constrain fixed-to-mobile termination rates
under a regime of CPP. This debate has taken place, or is actively
occurring, in Australia, Europe, Asia, and North America.
Several noted telecommunications economists have studied mobile
termination rates. In defense of the MPP system used in the United States,
Professor Jerry Hausman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1 Under CPP, the receiver will usually pay something for an incoming call, but the receiver
will not pay the incremental cost of termination.
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notes that the growing popularity of "bucket plans," which offer a large
number of incoming and outgoing minutes at a fixed price, has tempered
U.S. customers' reluctance to disclose their mobile telephone numbers.2
Hausman argues that, to the extent there is a problem of high termination
rates in countries that have embraced CPP, it is because customers are
ignorant of the charges they pay for their terminating calls.3 He concludes
that "consumer information would solve the potential market failure
problem without the need for regulatory interference in competition .... 'A
Professor Julian K. Wright of the University of Auckland shows that
above-cost termination rates result in low cellular prices (per minute) and
high penetration rates because of competition among mobile carriers to
sign new customers. 5 He finds that significant margins on access prices do
6not imply that access charges are set too high from a welfare perspective.
He suggests allowing the fixed-line network operator to set differential
prices to reflect different cellular termination rates and allowing the fixed-
line network operator to negotiate its own termination rates with the
MNOs freely: "As long as the firms' bargaining power is roughly
balanced, the tendency for cellular firms to set high termination charges
may be alleviated. 7
Professor James Mirrlees of the University of Cambridge explains that
the welfare gains that could be realized by a move toward regulation of
mobile call termination rates are modest at best.8 Mirrlees estimates that
the annual welfare increase would be roughly one-tenth the size of the
benefits upon which the U.K.'s Competition Commission relied in
justifying its price cap on mobile termination rates (£4.7 million versus
£54.5 million).9 He argues that the Commission failed to understand the
manner in which mobile operators stimulate mobile subscriptions and
increase welfare in the unregulated scenario by lowering other mobile rates
when they increase mobile termination rates. Professor Stephen Littlechild
of the University of Cambridge also provides a critique of the U.K.'s
Office of Telecommunications ("Oftel's") approach to regulation of
2 Jerry A. Hausman, Mobile Telephone, in 1 HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ECONOMICs 564, 595 (Martin Cave, Sumit K. Majumdar, & Ingo Vogelsang eds., 2002).
3 Id. at 596.
4 Id.
5 Julian K. Wright, Access Pricing Under Competition: An Application to Cellular
Networks, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 289 (2000).
6 Id. at 309.
7 Id. at 314.
8 Witness Statement of James Alexander Mirrlees, In the High Court of Justice Queen's
Bench Division Administrative Court, Between The Queen, on the Application of Vodafone Limited
and the Competition Commission and the Director General of Telecommunications, 2003 EWHC





mobile termination rates.' 0 Littlechild argues that, given the dynamic
nature of the mobile industry, remedies should focus more on promoting
entry and less on imposing price controls.1 These and other economists
oppose regulation of fixed-to-mobile termination rates.'
2
Other economists favor regulating mobile termination rates. For
example, Professor Mark Armstrong of Oxford University argues that
"even though networks compete vigorously for subscribers, they often
have a monopoly position in providing communications services to their
subscribers."' 3 He argues that carriers under CPP earn monopoly rents
from termination rates and use them to subsidize retail tariffs offered to
attract subscribers. 14  Armstrong advocates regulation of mobile
termination rates at marginal cost plus a factor that accounts for network
externalities.15
This Article provides an economic analysis of fixed-to-mobile
termination rates. In Part I, we survey the regulatory policies involving
mobile termination that various governments and international bodies have
considered and even adopted. We explain why MPP creates better
incentives than CPP for mobile network operators ("MNOs") to decrease
mobile termination rates. We provide a brief history of the U.S. experience
with MPP. There is no need to regulate mobile termination rates in the
United States or Canada because regulators in both countries have shunned
CPP. Finally, we demonstrate that minutes of cellular telephone use in the
United States and Canada have continued to increase at a significant pace
despite the MPP regime and are greater than in countries with CPP
regimes.
In Part II, we examine whether MNOs have market power in the
provision of terminating access to mobile networks. We examine demand
substitution for fixed-to-mobile calls, a consideration that has received
surprisingly little attention to date in the debate over mobile termination
10 S.C. Littlechild, Regulators, Competition, and Transitional Price Controls: A Critique of
Price Restraints in Electricity Supply and Mobile Telephones (Feb. 20, 2002) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation), available at
http://www.iea.org.uk/record.jsp?type=article&ID=38. Oftel's approach involves analyzing the return
on capital achieved by mobile operators. Id. at 80.
11 Id. at 5.
12 See, e.g., DAVID NEWBERY, VODAFONE LIMITED, REGULATING MOBILE CALL
TERMINATION (July 18, 2003) (arguing that there is a case for subsidizing mobile subscriptions relative
to incremental cost because new mobile subscribers confer a network externality on existing mobile
and fixed line subscribers, which new mobile subscribers will undervalue in making the subscription
decision). See also Christopher Doyle & Jennifer C. Smith, Market Structure in Mobile Telecoms:
Qualified Indirect Access and the Receiver Pays Principle, 10 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 471 (1998).
13 Mark Armstrong, The Theory of Access Pricing and Interconnection, in I HANDBOOK OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS EcoNoMicS 295, 337 (Martin Cave, Sumit K. Majumdar, & Ingo Vogelsang
eds., 2002) (emphasis in original).
14 Id.
15 Id. at 341-43.
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rates. We also consider how the joint demand of the calling party and the
receiving party constrains mobile termination rates. When mobile
customers even partially internalize the welfare of their callers, as they
could be expected to do for family or business associates, the economic
justification for regulating mobile call termination in a competitive market
greatly diminishes.
In Part III, we explain why mobile rates, including termination rates,
cannot and should not be equal to marginal cost. In particular, MNOs
typically recover large fixed network costs and customer acquisition costs
from variable charges. Next, we explain why network externalities in
mobile telecommunications justify mobile termination rates that exceed
marginal cost. We explain how mobile termination rates that exceed
marginal cost are consistent with Ramsey (quasi-efficient) pricing. Finally,
we show that regulation of fixed-to-mobile termination rates at marginal
cost (or even slightly higher to account for network externalities) would
not be socially optimal.
In Part IV, we show that, compared with price regulation of mobile
termination rates, a number of other policy measures would be more
efficacious in remedying any market failure that regulators believe exists
on the ground that consumers currently lack complete information about
mobile termination rates. The simplest rule would require, through a
"ping" or brief recorded message, the identification of the mobile carrier
that is about to complete a call originating on the fixed network. Other
possible rules include mandatory public disclosure of mobile termination
rates and the substitution of negotiation for regulation of mobile-to-fixed
termination rates.
I. The Global Movement To Regulate Mobile Termination Rates
Mobile termination is not an issue in the United States because the
United States has rejected a CPP regime. In nations that have embraced
CPP, regulators have examined the rates that MNOs charge to terminate
calls on their networks. For example, the United Kingdom's former
telecommunications regulator, Oftel, imposed price regulation on mobile
termination, and the Competition Commission has investigated the matter
at length. The Competition Directorate of the European Commission ("DG
Competition") is actively considering price regulation. 16 In Japan, the
government has examined the question of mobile termination rates but has
16 A study group of the International Telecommunications Union ("ITU") has recommended
price regulation. See INT'L TELECOMMS. UNION, TELECOM STANDARDIZATION RECOMMENDATION
D.150, § 2.5.2 (June 1999) (requiring mobile termination rates to be "cost orientated, separately




taken no action. In the United States, the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") and the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") have
tried to influence, if not explicitly regulate, mobile termination rates in
other countries through American telecommunications legislation and U.S.
trade policy. After we present the theory that CPP gives mobile network
operators market power over mobile termination rates, we discuss
developments in each of these jurisdictions.
A. The Theory That CPP Gives MNOs Market Power over Mobile
Termination Rates
By subscribing to an MNO's mobile telephone service, the subscriber
purchases a bundle of service offerings. The provision of mobile services
consists of three major components: (1) call origination, which allows a
mobile subscriber to call his own mobile network (known as "on-net"
calls) or other mobile and fixed-line networks ("off-net" calls); (2) call
termination, which allows a mobile subscriber to receive a mobile call; and
(3) value-added services such as short message services ("SMS") or
information services.' 7 The MNO derives revenue from each of these
services. Under both MPP and CPP, the MNO collects charges for
outgoing call services and value-added services from its mobile
subscribers. Under a CPP regime, the MNO collects access charges for
termination services (mobile termination rates) from the caller's network,
which in turn collects the charges from the caller.'8 Under an MPP regime,
by contrast, the MNO collects termination charges from the caller's fixed
network and from the mobile subscriber receiving the call. Figure 1
summarizes the payments of mobile termination rates.
17 See, e.g., BLUE SKY TELECOM SOLUTIONS, WHITE PAPER: INTERCONNECTION SERVICES
3-7 (2003), available at http://www.bstsolutions.co.uk/whitepapers/
BSTS%20oWhitepaperInterconnection%20Services.pdf, Press Release, SoloMio, SoloMio To
Showcase Power of Smart Call Services Platform at Parlay Conference in San Diego, May 20, 2003,
available at http://www.solomio.com/news/20may03_pr/0,1 193,,00.html (stating that SoloMio value-
added services "enable Mobile Operators to increase call origination, call termination, and message
origination").
18 For a brief description of the different services and revenue streams under a CPP regime,
see AUSL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM'N, PRICING METHODOLOGY FOR THE GSM
TERMINATION SERVICE 25-26 (July 2001), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/
index.phtml/itemld/341564 [hereinafter ACCC 2001 STUDY].
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Figure 1: Payments of Mobile Termination Rates






As Figure 1 shows, under a CPP system, the MNO bills the caller's
network $0.16 per minute19 in this hypothetical example. The caller's
network ultimately passes that charge along to its customer. Under an MPP
system with reciprocal compensation,20 the MNO charges the caller's
network $0.005 per minute and deducts one minute of service from the
mobile subscriber's bucket of minutes. If the subscriber uses his exact
allotment of minutes per month, the average cost of receiving the call is
$0.09 per minute22 in this example. So, the MNO implicitly embeds the
19 This rate is the average fixed-to-mobile termination rate per minute among Western
European MNOs, according to the FCC. See Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market
Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, 18 F.C.C.R. 14,783 207 (2003) [hereinafter
FCC Eighth Annual Report].
20 Reciprocal compensation refers to the payments made between telecommunications
carriers for terminating each other's local exchange traffic on their networks.
21 This rate is the average fixed-to-mobile termination rate per minute among U.S. MNOs,
according to the FCC. Id. 1 207
22 This rate is the average rate per minute for Sprint PCS customers who select the 500-





$0.005 per minute in the price per minute (if any) that it charges its
subscriber. Under U.S. practice, each network pays the other for calls that
it sends to the latter's network. The fixed network does not pass these
charges on to the caller, but it receives $0.005 per minute for calls sent to
it by the MNO.
The generally perceived consequence of this revenue structure is that
MNOs have an incentive to keep the price of those services required and
paid for by the mobile subscriber at a level that is low enough to attract
and retain customers. But, MNOs have less incentive to minimize the price
of terminating calls from non-subscribers. 23 To the extent that mobile
customers do not fully internalize the costs incurred by fixed-line
customers who call them, competition among MNOs in a CPP regime will
not bring mobile termination rates in line with marginal cost. Because
mobile subscribers pay only for the calls they make under CPP, the theory
goes, competition among MNOs to attract and retain customers exerts
downward pressure on the price of outgoing mobile calls but not on mobile
termination rates. This theory of "caller exploitation" presumes that fixed-
line callers have little choice but to terminate their calls on the mobile
subscriber's network.
B. Examples of Countries That Have Embraced the CPP Regime
Several countries have embraced CPP and the associated regulation of
mobile termination rates. Presumably, regulators in those countries have
accepted the theory that CPP confers market power on mobile operators
and leads to the exploitation of callers from fixed networks. For example,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD")
has stated that in CPP countries "there will be little competitive pressure
on fixed-to-mobile termination charges," a situation that the OECD
believes will lead to supracompetitive rates.24 The OECD recommended
that its member governments regulate fixed-to-mobile termination rates if
the rates have been persistently high.25
The International Telecommunications Union ("ITU") has also
recommended that national regulatory authorities ("NRAs") regulate
mobile termination rates.2 6 In 2003, the ITU suggested that, in the absence
Apr. 17, 2004).
23 For a concurring view, see OFTEL, REVIEW OF THE CHARGE CONTROL ON CALLS TO
MOBILES 4 (Sept. 26, 2001), available at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/mobile/ctmO9Ol.pdf [hereinafter OFTEL
STUDY].
24 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION AND REGULATION ISSUES IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 9 (Feb. 1, 2002).
25 Id. at 33.
26 VALERIE FELDMAN, ITU STRATEGY AND POLICY GROUP, MOBILE OVERTAKES FIXED:
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND REGULATION § 6.2.2 (June 2003), available at
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of price controls, consumers lack bargaining power vis-A-vis MNOs in
CPP countries.27 In addition, the ITU explained that international mobile
termination rates require special attention because of the additional need
for interconnection agreements between countries. 2' The ITU
recommended that NRAs either impose price controls or increase
competition through encouraging the development of mobile virtual
network operators ("MVNOs"). 29 Although the ITU acknowledged that
consumers in MPP countries pay lower termination rates than consumers
in CPP countries, it reasoned that MPP reduces mobile access and is not
socially desirable.30
In this section, we review the initiatives of several NRAs (and the
European Union) concerning fixed-to-mobile termination rates.
1. Australia
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ("ACCC")
articulated its initial position on mobile termination rates in its report,
PricingT Methodology for the GSM Termination Service, issued in July
2001.? In its Mobile Services Review 2003 Discussion Paper, the ACCC
found that mobile termination rates in Australia were "not at excessively
high levels by international standards." 32 The ACCC noted that it would
continue to regulate termination rates for global system mobile
communications ("GSM") and code division multiple access ("CDMA")
services as long as regulation (1) promoted competition, (2) increased
connectivity, and (3) produced economically efficient investments in the
technology.33 The ACCC chose to continue regulating mobile termination
http://www.itu.int/osglspu/ni/ mobileovertakes/Resources/MobileovertakesjPaper.pdf.
27 Id. § 6.1.2.
28 Id. § 6.2.2.
29 Id. MVNOs are networks that provide cellular service by leasing frequency from cellular
network operators. They are typically well-known brands that repackage bandwidth and give the
impression of being cellular network operators by offering unique services and/or calling plans. For
example, Virgin Mobile, resells Sprint cellular services in the United States to youth through prepaid
calling plans.
30 Id. § 2.1.2.
31 ACCC 2001 STUDY, supra note 18. The ACCC confirmed its position in two subsequent
decisions. See AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM'N, PRICING METHODOLOGY FOR THE GSM
AND CDMA TERMINATION SERVICES (June 2002), available at
http://www.accc.gov.au/contentitem.phtl?itemld=341518&nodeld=file3f24a2985b0ed&fn=Pricing
%20MethodologyO/o20for%20the%20GSM%20and/o20CDMA%20Termination%20services%20-
%20Drafti/20Report.pdf; AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM'N, VARIATION TO MAKE THE
GSM SERVICE DECLARATIONS TECHNOLOGY-NEUTRAL (Mar. 2002), available at
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemld/378914/fromltemld/269262.
32 AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM'N, MOBILE SERVICES REVIEW 2003
DISCUSSION PAPER 34 (Apr. 2003), available at
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemld=397852&nodeld-file3fadd74b2d9cc&f
n = Disc% 2
OPaperMobile%2OServ%20ReviewAprO3.pdf.




rates on the rationale that an MNO controls access to mobile termination
and the public lacks knowledge about mobile termination rates, which
allows an MNO to raise prices without fear of competition.14 The ACCC
also invited comments on whether it should keep a regulatory scheme for
mobile termination that compared changes in the mobile termination rate
to changes in the MNO's retail price. 35 The ACCC noted that, despite its
imposition of retail-to-wholesale benchmarking on MNOs in 2001, mobile
termination rates may have increased.36
Numerous parties responded to the ACCC's request for comment. For
example, MCI and AAPT (the wireless subsidiary of Telecom New
Zealand), which both had attempted unsuccessfully to enter the Australian
mobile telephony market in 2001, asked the ACCC to lower mobile
termination rates to European levels. 37 Telstra and other MNOs argued that
no Australian MNO could exercise market power because of intense
competition and that the ACCC had no evidence that any MNO was
earning economic rents from its mobile termination rate.3' The MNOs
further argued that lowering the mobile termination rate would result in
higher usage fees for mobile customers.39 The ACCC announced its
intention to release a draft report by September of 2003, with a goal of
issuing its final report by the end of 2003. As of October 2003, the ACCC
had not released its draft report.
2. United Kingdom
The major U.K. MNOs-BT Cellnet, One2One, Orange, and
Vodafone--opposed regulation of mobile termination rates by the Office
of Telecommunications ("Oftel"). In December 2000, these MNOs
submitted an economic report to Oftel by David Newbery of Cambridge
University, Raquel Noriega of the consultancy LECG, and Leonard
Waverman of London Business School. Newbery, Noriega, and
Waverman explained that MNOs had little incentive to raise mobile
termination rates because doing so would discourage calls to mobile
34 Id. at 31.
35 Id. at 39.
36 Id. at 49.
37 MCI, COMMENTS OF MCI REGARDING THE AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER
COMMISSION DISCUSSION PAPER ON MOBILE SERVICES REVIEW 2003, at 4 (June 13, 2003), available
at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemld=397880&noded-fie3ffa39f97b45e&fn
=MCI%20oInc.pdf.
38 TELSTRA, INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE DISCUSSION PAPER OF THE AUSTRALIAN
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networks and decrease overall profits. 40 Oftel rejected these arguments on
the grounds that they did not explain how an increasing number of MNOs
would drive down the mobile termination rate or how soon the rates would
fall.41 In May 2001, the U.K. MNOs submitted a second report to Oftel by
these same economists, which argued that mobile termination rates should
exceed marginal cost to allow MNOs to recover the fixed costs of the
network, such as mobile towers and licenses. Oftel rejected this
argument, reasoning that the MNOs had failed to demonstrate that their
termination rates were at an efficient level to recover fixed costs and that
nothing prevented the MNOs from raising prices above the efficient level
in the absence of regulation.43
In September 2001, Oftel "recommended" that MNOs in the United
Kingdom decrease their termination rates by twelve percent per year to
bring the rates down to roughly $0.06 per minute.44 Three large MNOs
contested the recommendation, and Oftel referred the matter to the
Competition Commission for a determination of whether the firms' mobile
termination rates reflected a competitive marketplace and, if not, what the
appropriate remedy should be.45
In its Remedies Letter and Statement of July 2002, the Competition
Commission emphasized that the MNOs charged mobile termination rates
that exceeded the reasonable estimates of "true cost.' 46 The Commission
expressed concern that the subsidy paid by fixed-line users represented a
market distortion.47 The Competition Commission agreed with Oftel that a
price cap would provide the best regulation for fixed-to-mobile
termination rates, reasoning that price caps would force prices lower while
allowing MNOs to vary termination rates efficiently. 48 Although the
Commission briefly considered switching to an MPP system as a remedy,
it evidently did so only to invite further comments.49 Finally, although the
40 David Newbery, Raquel Noriega, & Leonard Waverman, LECG, The Economics of
Mobile Call Termination (Dec. 12,2000).
41 OFTEL STUDY, supra note 23, at 58-59.
42 David Newbery, Raquel Noriega, & Leonard Waverman, LECG, Efficient Pricing of
Mobile Call Termination, LRIC Examined.
43 OFTEL STUDY, supra note 23, at 80.
44 Id. Oftel's action was technically a "recommendation" rather than an order because Ofiel
could not enforce the regulation without an order from the Competition Commission. In the past, the
MNOs had agreed to Oftel's recommendations on pricing.
45 See UK Oftel Refers Operators to Competition Commssion That Could Threaten 3G
Rollout, 3GNEWSROOM.COM, Dec. 12, 2001, at
http://www.3gnewsroom.com/3gnews/dec_01/news_1610.shtml.
46 COMPETITION COMM'N, MOBILE PHONES INQUIRY: STATEMENT OF HYPOTHETCIAL
REMEDIES 7 (July 23, 2002), available at http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/pressrel/archive/2002/jul/pdf/39-02rem.pdf. The phrase "true cost" is used
frequently by Ofiel but is never defined.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 10.
49 Id. at 12.
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Commission acknowledged that the regulation of fixed-line termination
rates gives MNOs a competitive advantage vis-A-vis fixed-line operators,
the agency did not consider deregulation of fixed-line termination rates to
be a viable remedy.50
In January 2003, the Competition Commission completed its inquiry
into mobile termination rates and authorized Oftel to order the two largest
MNOs, Vodafone and mm02, to decrease their rates by fifteen percent by
July 2003 and then by fifteen percent per year thereafter until March 31,
2006.51 Oftel also ordered the third and fourth largest MNOs, Orange and
T-Mobile, to decrease their termination rates by fourteen percent by July
2003 and then by fourteen percent per year until March 31, 2006.2
In June 2003, Orange, T-Mobile, and Vodafone appealed Oftel's
decision to the Administrative Court of the High Court of Justice, but the
High Court affirmed the regulator's decision.53 Vodafone, Orange, and T-
Mobile then notified customers that, to compensate for the decrease in
revenues from lower mobile termination rates, the MNOs would raise the
prices of handsets, outgoing calls, and text messaging. 4 In addition, the
companies warned that the ordered reduction in mobile termination rates
would delay the introduction of third-generation (3G) data services, with
mm02 announcing that it would delay the implementation of next-
generation phones until late 2004.5 In September 2003, Vodafone,
Orange, T-Mobile, and mm02 challenged Oftel's authority to mandate
future rate reductions, arguing that only Ofcom, the new regulatory56
commission created by the Communications Act of 2003, could
promulgate future rules on mobile termination rates. The MNOs also
argued that the future price reductions imposed by Oftel in January 2003
were not legally binding.5 7 As of October 2003, the High Court of Justice
had not decided the case.
Oftel had considerable influence with other European NRAs, and it is
50 Id. at 5 (asserting that MNOs "appear to enjoy a competitive advantage over the FNOs
[fixed network operators], whose termination charges to MNOs and retention on calls from mobiles are
effectively regulated to levels at or near cost").
51 OFTEL, REPORTS ON REFERENCES UNDER SECTION 13 OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ACT 1984 ON THE CHARGES MADE BY VODAFONE, 02, ORANGE AND T-MOBILE FOR TERMINATING
CALLS FROM FIXED AND MOBILE NETWORKS §§ 1.12(a)-(d) (Jan. 22, 2003), available at
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/reppub/reports/2003/fulltext/475cl .pdf.
52 Id.
53 T-Mobile, Ltd. v. Competition Comm'n, [2003] A.C.D. 72 (Q.B. Admin. Ct 2003).
54 Sean Poulter, Mobile Firms Plan 700M Revenge for Cheaper Call Costs, DAILY MAIL,
June 28, 2003, at 13, available at 2003 WL 63928004.
55 Joel Cooper, Price Controls Will Impact on 3G Roll-Out, Says mmO2 CEO, WMRC
DAILY ANALYSIS, Oct. 10, 2002, available at 2002 WL 106431289; Press Release, mm02, Preliminary
Results for the 12 Months Ended 31 March 2003, REG. NEWS SERVICE, May 21, 2003, available at
2003 WL 55379448.
56 Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, §§ 1.2-1.3, 1.6 (Eng.).
57 Sean Poulter, Mobile Networks To Fight Price Cuts, DAILY MAIL, Oct. 1, 2003, at 15,
available at 2003 WL 64341354.
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the most significant regulatory body to date to impose mobile termination
rates. We will therefore discuss Oftel's specific rationales for doing so in
greater detail throughout this article.
3. European Commission
In 2002, mobile termination rates in Europe ranged from 0.23E per
minute for Mobistar in Belgium to 0.128C per minute for Sonera in
Finland.58 In response to complaints from the FCC and U.S. long-distance
carriers that those termination rates were excessive, the European
Commission, acting through its Directorate General for Information and
Society ("DG InfoSoc"), adopted new guidelines in February 2002."9 The
guidelines sought to articulate how Europe's NRAs should define market
power and competition for the purpose of establishing a list of
telecommunications services that require regulation.60 In February 2003,
DG InfoSoc included call termination in the array of services that NRAs
are required to regulate. 61 DG InfoSoc gave member states until July 25,
2003 to pass any regulations that it had promulgated,62 but only three of
the fifteen member states met the deadline. NRAs in France and the
Netherlands indicated that passage of such laws might be significantly
delayed,63 and Germany had not implemented the provisions on mobile
termination rates as of August 2003. 64 In January 2004, the EU
Commission's "Article 7 Task Force" strongly criticized, in published
comments, the implementation of the EU Regulatory Framework by the
Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority ("Ficora") with respect to
its decision to exclude fixed-to-mobile termination rates from regulatory
remedies. This development may have significant ramifications for
regulation of mobile termination rates in the EU.65
58 Michelle Donegan & Simon Dux, Rate Cuts Won't Stop Mobile Data, COMM. WEEK
INT'L, Jan. 1, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WL 13588339.
59 Commission Directive 2002/21/EC, Annex 1, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 33; Guidelines on the
Assessment of Significant Market Power in the Communications Industry, GLOBAL COUNS. MAG.,
Sept. 1, 2002, at 55, available at 2002 WL 20572608.
60 Commission Directive, supra note 59, at 33.
61 Commission Recommendation 2003/31 1/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 114) 45.
62 Slow Road to Reform, CONSTRUCTION PLUS, Aug. 4, 2003, available at 2003 WL
59628364.
63 Id.
64 Id. MTRs are not regulated in Germany.
65 For discussion and analysis, see Reinhard Schu, EU Commission Says that NRAs Must
Set Aside National Laws Incompatible with the EU Regulatory Framework, ARNOLD & PORTER
EUROPEAN TELECOMS NEWSL., Jan. 2004, available at http://aporter.pair.com/newsletter/7
9 9 1 l1l.pdf.
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4. Other National Regulatory Authorities and National Competition
Authorities within the European Union
European MNOs also have faced investigations of their mobile
termination rates by other national competition authorities and national
regulatory authorities. In July 2003, the Irish telecommunications
regulator, ComReg, ordered the two leading mobile companies, Vodafone
and mm02 Ireland, to decrease their mobile termination rates.66 The Italian
Ministry of Communications, which has regulated mobile termination
rates since the 1990s, also ordered MNOs to reduce mobile termination
rates in February 2002.67 The competition authority in the Netherlands,
NMa, announced in July 2003 that it would investigate mobile termination
rates after Opta, the telecommunications regulator, had held that Dutch
MNOs enjoyed monopoly power over call termination on their customers'
networks.68
5. Japan
Although mobile termination rates are lower in Japan than in either
Australia or the European Union, the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR")
has nonetheless pressured the Japanese government to order MNOs to
decrease mobile termination rates further.69 USTR reported that, at the
urging of the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts, and
Telecommunications ("MPHPT"), Japanese MNOs reduced mobile
termination rates by 12.5% in 2001 and 5.5% in 2002.70 It bears emphasis
66 COMM'N FOR COMMUNICATIONS REGULATION, MOBILE ACCOUNTING SEPARATION AND
COSTING METHODOLOGIES, INFORMATION NOTICE 03/71, at 5 (June 27, 2003), available at
http://www.comreg.ie/_fileupload/publications/ComReg0371.pdf; Press Release, Commission for
Communications Regulation, ComReg Welcomes Reductions in Mobile Termination Rates Ensuring
that Irish Rates Stay Among the Lowest in Europe (July 28, 2003), available at
http:l/www.comreg.ie/_fileupload/ publications/PR280703.pdf.
67 MINISTRO DELLE COMUNICAZIONI, CONDIZIONI ECONOMICHE DELLE COMUNICAZIONI
FISSO-MOBILE ORIGINATE DALLA RETE TELECOM ITALIA, DELIBERA NO 10/99, available at
http://www.comunicazioni.it/it/index.php?IdPag=407; Preliminary 2002 Telecom Italia Mobile SpA
Earnings Conference Call-Final, FIN. DISCLOSURE WIRE, Mar. 10, 2003, available at 2003 WL
6693282.
68 Beleidsregels Inzake de Regulering van Mobiele Terminating Tarieven [Policy Rules
Regarding the Regulation of Mobile Terminating Tariffs], OPTA/IBT/2002/2200802, 22 (Mar. 28,
2002), available at http://www.opta.nl/download/mta_policyrules_300902.pdf; Joel Cooper,
Competition Authority To Investigate Dutch Mobile Termination Charges, WMRC DAILY ANALYSIS,
July 2, 2003, available at 2003 WL 58435339.
69 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2002 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN
TRADE BARRIERS 205 (Apr. 2, 2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/2002/japan.PDF;
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, RESULTS OF 2003 "SECTION 1377" REVIEW OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AGREEMENTS 2 (Apr. 2003), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sectors/industry/Telecoml377/2003/2003-04-02-results.pdf [hereinafter USTR
2003 SECTION 1377 REVIEW].
70 USTR 2003 SECTION 1377 REVIEW, supra note 69, at 2; Jeffrey Silva, Long-Distance
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that the Japanese MNOs voluntarily made these reductions. No formal
regulation exists by which the Japanese government mandates reductions
in mobile termination rates, although the MPHPT actively monitors the
mobile termination rates charged by MNOs. In August 2002, the MPIPT
said that it would seek further reductions if it found that mobile
termination rates were not reasonable.71
In November 2002, the Ministry granted some landline operators (as
opposed to MNOs) the power to set retail prices for fixed-to-mobile calls,
and it agreed to study the issue in more depth "to put in place rapidly an
efficient and transparent system for setting reasonable charges for
interconnection. 7 2 In its 2002 annual report, NTT DoCoMo, Japan's
largest MNO, warned that the MPHPT's decision to empower landline
operators to set mobile termination rates could significantly reduce its
quarterly earnings. 73 NTT DoCoMo also expressed concern that fixed-line
callers would use Internet protocol ("IP") telephony to contact a mobile
customer, thereby reducing its revenues because NTT DoCoMo does not
derive any revenue from such a call other than the interconnection fees.7 4
NTT DoCoMo's concern suggests that voice over Internet protocol
("VOP") might soon constrain mobile termination rates.75
In October 2002, the FCC argued that high termination charges
abroad were responsible for high telephone rates for international calls
made from the United States. In January 2003, NTT DoCoMo responded
to the FCC that the appearance of high rates for calls originating in the
United States in fact reflected surcharges that long-distance carriers
imposed on calls to Japanese mobile subscribers, rather than high mobile
termination rates.76 Japanese MNOs emphasize that reductions in their
fixed-to-mobile termination rates are not always passed on in full to
international callers.77
Carriers Question Japan's Wireless Interconnect Fees, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, May 27, 2002, at 4,
available at 2002 WL 10370838.
71 MINISTRY OF PUB. MGMT., HOME AFFAIRS, POSTS, & TELECOMMS., TELECOMMS.
COUNCIL, FINAL REPORT ON DESIRABLE PRO-COMPETITIVE POLICIES IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
BUSINESS FIELD FOR PROMOTING THE IT REVOLUTION § 2-2 (Aug. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.soumu.go.jp/joho-tsusin/eng/Resources/Counci/030312_1 .html.
72 MINISTRY OF PUB. MGMT., HOME AFFAIRS, POSTS & TELECOMMS., TELECOMMS.
BUREAU, INT'L POLICY DIVISION, INT'L AFFAIRS DEP'T, DECISION CONCERNING APPLICATION BY
HEISEI DENDEN Co., LTD. BASED ON ARTICLE 39-3 OF THE TELECOMM. BUS. LAW (Nov. 22, 2002),
available at http://www.soumu.go.jp/johotsusin/eng/Releases/Telecommunications/
news021122_ .html.
73 NTT DoCoMo, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 65 (English ed. 2003).
74 Id.
75 As we explain in greater detail later in the paper, firms that offer VOIP pay the off-net
mobile-to-mobile termination charge rather than the fixed-to-mobile termination charge.
76 COMMENTS BY NTT DOCOMO INC., IN RE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS POLICY
REFORM INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT RATES, IB Dkt. No. 02-324, at 3-5 (Jan. 14, 2003), available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-dcument=6513402563.
77 Id.; Jeffrey Silva, UK Termination Issue Crosses Atlantic, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, Jan.
Vol. 21:261, 2004
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6. Summary of Regional Regulatory Initiatives
In countries that use CPP, telecommunications regulators have
initiated several efforts to regulate fixed-to-mobile termination rates. Table
1 summarizes the regional regulatory initiatives.
Table 1: Summary of Regional Regulatory Initiatives Relating
to Mobile Termination Rates, as of October 2003
Country Initiatives Relating to Mobile Termination Rate ("MTR")
Australia ACCC issued discussion paper, but has not issued final decision.
France ART ordered MTR reduced to 0.1 494C per minute by January 1, 2004.
Germany RegTP does not regulate MTRs because it concluded that MTRs were suffi-
ciently low.
Ireland ComReg reached an agreement with Vodafone and mm02-Ireland to de-
crease MTRs.
Italy AGCOM ordered MTR reductions to 0. 1495€ per minute.
Japan MPHPT reduced rates by 14.2% in 2001 and 5.5% in 2002; MPHPT em-
powered some landline operators to set MTRs. At the same time, MPHPT
initiated freedom of choice for relay carriers regarding fixed-to-mobile
phones from 2005.
The Netherlands Opta reduced MTRs to best practice rates as determined by averaging MTRs
charged by other European MNOs.
United Kingdom Oftel recommended 14% to 15% reductions on MTRs per year until 2006.
Sources: Press Release, Autoritd de Rdgulation des T6lcommunications, Fixed-to-Mobile Call Prices
Lowered (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.art-telecom.fr/communiques/pressrelease/2003/angO3-
3 l.htm; Letter from Vodafone, to Ms. Gloria Blue, Executive Secretary, United States Trade Represen-
tative 4 (Jan. 23, 2004), available at
http://216.239.39.104/search?q=cache:QFEFDmvsOJ:www.ustr.gov/sectors/industry/Telecoml377/2
004/reply.
For example, in the United Kingdom, Oftel has implemented
mandatory reductions in mobile termination rates. Regulators in the
Netherlands and Ireland have sought "voluntary" agreements to reduce
fixed-to-mobile termination rates. MNOs have responded to these
20, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WL 9785857.
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regulatory pressures by warning that other mobile rates will increase and
deployment of 3G systems will be retarded. Such potential costs of price
regulation will fall primarily on local consumers.
C. The Federal Communications Commission and U.S. Trade
Representative's Support for Regulation of Mobile Termination Rates
Outside the United States
In July 1999, the FCC studied the merits of CPP in the United
States.78  The Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association
("CTIA"), the industry trade association representing U.S. MNOs, favored
supplementing MPP with CPP. 79 CTIA argued that CPP, combined with
the growing popularity of prepaid plans, would allow lower income groups
to enjoy wireless calling. 0 In conjunction with CPP, CTIA endorsed a
notification system that would inform the fixed-line caller that he would be
billed for the call.8' CTIA did not support notification that would identify
the MNO connecting the call or the termination rate that the caller would
be charged; CTIA argued that providing this information would be
prohibitively expensive for the MNOs.8 2 Finally, CTIA urged the FCC to
refrain from regulating mobile termination rates if it did allow CPP as an
83option. Interest in CPP as a possible supplement to MPP in the United
States waned in 2000 as AT&T Wireless and other MNOs introduced one-
rate, bucket plans.84 Because the mobile subscriber's marginal cost of
mobile termination under a bucket plan is zero if the mobile customer's
allotted minutes exceed the used minutes, the question of who should pay
for a call that terminates on a U.S. mobile network became hypothetical.
By 2002, analysts dismissed any possibility that CPP would supplement
MPP in the United States. 5
In September 2002, the FCC released a "consumer alert" warning
U.S. consumers that "when wireline U.S. customers call foreign wireless
customers, foreign carriers may pass through to the U.S. carrier the
additional cost of connecting the wireless call."86 A month later, the FCC
78 Calling Party Pays Service Offering in the Commercial Mobile Radio Services, WT Dkt.
No. 97-207, 14 F.C.C.R. 10,861 1 (proposed July 9, 1999).
79 COMMENTS OF CTIA, CALLING PARTY PAYS SERVICE OFFERING IN THE COMMERCIAL






84 See, e.g., Heather Forsgren Weaver, Sugrue: Wireless Bureau Spent Too Much Time on
CPP, RCR WIRELESS NEwS, Feb. 3, 2003, at 11, available at 2003 WL 9785971.
85 Id.
86 Federal Communications Commission, Consumer Advisory, Surcharges for International




issued a notice of proposed rulemaking ("NPRM"), the final portion of
which addressed "the issue of foreign mobile termination rates and
whether such rates are detrimentally affecting U.S. consumers and
competition in the U.S.-international services market."87 Noting that
mobile termination rates approached $0.33 per minute in some countries,
the NPRM asked, "How are foreign mobile carriers or landline carriers
involved in mobile termination able to exert market power in this context,
given that ... we have found that the international market has become
substantially more competitive?"88
The USTR under both the Clinton and second Bush administrations
has undertaken efforts to negotiate reductions in foreign mobile
termination rates through bilateral agreements and the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"). Since 1997, the United States has reached
agreements regarding mobile termination rates with the European Union,
Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan.8 9 In April 2003, the USTR expressed
concern about Australian mobile termination rates to the Australian
government, which directed the ACCC to seek public comment and further
review.
90
Each year, the USTR solicits comment on whether other countries are
complying with market-opening commitments made pursuant to the WTO
agreement on basic telecommunications services. This inquiry, conducted
pursuant to Section 1377 of Title 19 of the U.S. Code, supplies the USTR
with the factual record that it uses to write its annual report on alleged
WTO violations by trading partners of the United States. 91 In 2002, the
three large American interexchange carriers-AT&T, MCI WorldCom,
and Sprint-complained to the USTR that they were being harmed by high
fixed-to-mobile termination rates in other nations. In March 2002, the
Competitive Telecommunications Association ("CompTel") complained to
the USTR about high mobile termination rates in Italy.92 CompTel argued
that, unlike its French and U.K. counterparts, the Italian NRA
("AGCOM") had failed to decrease mobile termination rates
87 International Settlements Policy Reform 17 F.C.C.R. 19,954 51 (2002).
88 Id.
89 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FIRST REPORT TO THE LEADERS ON THE U.S.-JAPAN
REGULATORY REFORM AND COMPETITION POLICY INITIATIVE, FACT SHEET 2 (June 25, 2002),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/japan/2002-06-25-report-to-leaders-factsheet.PDF
("Reaffirming that Japan's dominant mobile carrier, NTT DoCoMo, is required to offer cost-based,
non-discriminatory interconnection rates to other operators.").
90 AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM'N, supra note 32, at 50; Simon Hayes,
Canberra Rejects Move on High Wholesale Prices, THE AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 19, 2003, at 26, available
at 2003 WL 61768705.
91 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1377, 19 U.S.C. § 3106 (1998).
92 Letter from CompTel, to Ms. Gloria Blue, Executive Secretary, United States Trade
Representative (Mar. 13, 2002), available at http://www.
comptel.org/filings/ustr-italy_secl377mar13_2002_add.doc.
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substantially. 93 Although it acknowledged that in 1999 AGCOM had
decreased mobile termination rates for the two largest MNOs (Telecom
Italia Mobile and Omnitel Pronto Italia), CompTel argued that AGCOM
had not taken any actions since then, despite opening an investigation into
the matter in 2000.94 Finally, CompTel complained that the Italian
processes lacked transparency, noting that the data used by AGCOM to
determine the mobile termination rate reductions had been known only to
the two MNOs.95
The USTR accepted these complaints and made them part of its
assessment of the state of foreign compliance with the WTO agreement. In
its subsequent report issued in April 2002, the USTR cited evidence that
MNOs in the EU and Japan charge termination rates for fixed-to-mobile
calls that significantly exceed costs. 96 The USTR estimated that, with the
rapid growth in mobile wireless services, the burden of these above-cost
charges on U.S. operators and consumers could soon reach billions of
dollars annually. The USTR therefore urged Japan, the European
Commission, and EU member states to ensure that MNOs charge what the
USTR regarded as competitive mobile termination rates.
97
The USTR's negotiations with Japan, first undertaken in 1997 under
the Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy and then
in June 2002 under the US.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition
Policy Initiative, led to an agreement to reduce Japan's mobile termination
rates.98 Despite these reductions, the USTR continued to express concern
over the subsequent implementation of the agreements.99 The USTR
criticized NTT DoCoMo's termination rates in the 2002 Report on Trade
Barriers.100 By May 2003, however, the USTR acknowledged that NTT
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1-2.
95 Id. at 2.
96 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, RESULTS OF THE 2002 "SECTION 1377" REVIEW OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADE AGREEMENTS 1 (Apr. 3, 2002), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sectors/industry/Telecom 1377/2002review.PDF.
97 Id.
98 MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, THIRD JOINT STATUS REPORT ON THE U.S.-
JAPAN ENHANCED INITIATIVE ON DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION POLICY 1-2 (July 22, 2000),
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/reportOO07.html; U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, FIRST REPORT TO THE LEADERS ON THE U.S.-JAPAN REGULATORY REFORM AND
COMPETITION POLICY INITIATIVE 3 (June 26, 2002), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/japan/2002-06-25-report-to leaders.PDF.
99 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FOURTH JOINT STATUS REPORT UNDER THE U.S.-JAPAN
ENHANCED INITIATIVE ON DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION POLICY, FACT SHEET 2 (June 30, 2001)
(asserting that "to address these problems, Japan will[,] . .. in the case of mobile interconnection,
ensure that tariffs for NTT DoCoMo are publicly disclosed and reflect the costs of an efficient
operator").
100 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2002 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN
TRADE BARRIERS 206 (Apr. 2, 2002), available at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/2002/japan.PDF.
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DoCoMo had significantly reduced its mobile termination rates.'
0'
As we noted earlier, Japanese MNOs told the USTR in January 2003
that U.S. long-distance carriers had not passed on Japanese reductions in
fixed-to-mobile termination rates to their American customers. Vodafone
similarly told the USTR in January 2003 that the majority of the cost to an
American calling someone on an overseas mobile network comes from
surcharges that U.S. long-distance operators impose.10 2 Vodafone noted
that, despite a ten percent decline in the mobile termination rates in Europe
since February 2001, AT&T's retail surcharge to its long-distance
customers did not decline.
03
D. Both Parties Pay for Mobile Calls in the United States
The United States uses a MPP system for mobile termination rather
than CPP. MPP forces mobile customers to internalize termination rates,
which in theory should generate lower mobile termination rates. In
addition, the intercarrier compensation regime in the United States has
served to lower termination rates. Despite the theoretical predictions of the
superiority of CPP in encouraging mobile penetration, mobile telephone
subscribers in the United States actually use their mobile phones far more
intensively than do subscribers in countries with CPP regimes, and mobile
penetration in MPP countries is increasingly rapidly.
1. MPP and Reciprocal Compensation Agreements Obviate the
Regulation of Mobile Termination Rates
Because the MPP system forces mobile subscribers to internalize
termination rates, competition for mobile subscribers places downward
pressure on mobile termination rates. The same competitive pressures do
not exist in CPP regimes. In addition to using MPP, MNOs in the United
States are entitled to a reciprocal compensation rate that provides for the
recovery of "a reasonable approximation of the additional costs [to the
carrier] of terminating" calls from the other carrier.1°4 In April 2001, the
FCC issued the Unified Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, which sought
comment on the application of its current orders and rules regarding
101 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SECOND REPORT TO THE LEADERS ON THE U.S.-JAPAN
REGULATORY REFORM AND COMPETITION POLICY INITIATIVE 4 (May 23, 2003).
102 Letter from Vodafone Americas, Inc., to Gloria Blue, Executive Secretary, United States
Trade Representative 3 (Jan. 24, 2003), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sectors/industry/Telecom 1377/2003/vodafone.PDF
103 COMMENTS OF VODAFONE ON NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE MAKING, INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS POLICY REFORM, IB Dkt. No. 02-234, 27 (Jan. 14, 2003), available at
http://gulIfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native -or_pdf=rpdf&iddocumen
t =6 5 1 3 4 0 2 5 5 7 .
104 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2)(A)(ii) (2004).
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asymmetric reciprocal compensation to fixed-to-mobile interconnection.'
05
In May 2001, the FCC's Wireless Telecommunications Bureau and
Wireline Competition Bureau jointly declared that MNOs were entitled to
the opportunity to demonstrate that their termination costs exceed those of
incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs"). 106 The Bureaus explained
that the determination of "compensable wireless network components"
should be based on whether the particular wireless network components
are cost sensitive to increasing call traffic.
07
In its Eighth Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market
Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, the FCC in 2003
credited its own rules on intercarrier compensation with keeping mobile
termination rates low.108 The agency noted that, in contrast to the European
average fixed-to-mobile termination rate of $0.16 per minute in 2002, the
average mobile termination rate in the United States was $0.005 per
minute in 2002 (in addition to the airtime charge paid by the subscriber
receiving the call), 109 which roughly equaled the average rate for
terminating traffic on fixed networks. 10 The large difference between the
European average and the American average suggests that the U.S. system
of reciprocal compensation and MPP creates better incentives for MNOs to
lower mobile termination rates than CPP does.
2. Cellular Telephone Use Continues To Increase Significantly in
the United States and Canada
Some have argued that, under an MPP system, a mobile subscriber has
an incentive not to give out his mobile phone number or to switch off his
mobile phone when not placing calls so as to avoid being charged for
incoming calls."' But U.S. mobile operators have overcome these
disincentives by introducing bucket plans," 2 which permit the subscriber
to purchase a certain level of minutes for a flat monthly charge." 3 The
105 Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Intercarrier Compensation for
ISP-Bound Traffic, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 CC Dkt. No. 01-92, 16 F.C.C.R. 9610 101 (2001).
106 Letter from Thomas J. Sugrue, Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, and
Dorothy T. Attwood, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, to Charles McKee, Senior Attorney, Sprint PCS,
CC Dkt No. 95-185, 16 F.C.C.R. 9597 (2001).
107 Id.
108 FCC Eighth Annual Report, supra note 19, 209.
109 Id. 207
110 Id.
111 See, e.g., Hausman, supra note 2, at 595.
112 FCC Eighth Annual Report, supra note 19, 213.
113 For example, Sprint PCS charges customers $45 per month for a bucket of 500 "anytime"
minutes. If the subscriber uses fewer than 500 minutes per month, he is charged $45. If the subscriber
uses more than 500 minutes per month, he is charged $45 plus $0.40 per minute for each minute in
excess of 500 minutes. See Sprint, supra note 22.
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FCC in 2003 credited increases in the size of bucket plans, at declining
rates, with being "a major driver of average mobile usage in the United
States."'" 4 The FCC noted that bucket plans may increase the accessibility
of a mobile subscriber to his friends and family in an environment in
which he pays for both incoming and outgoing calls.' 5 Indeed, at least one
U.S. carrier, Nextel, began offering plans with free incoming minutes in
2003.16 Even without free minutes, the marginal cost of an incoming call
is zero if the mobile customer is below the allotment of minutes in his
bucket plan. The likelihood that a mobile customer will not exceed his
allotment obviously increases as MNOs refine their bucket plans to allow
the customer to supplement his monthly allotment with unused "rollover
minutes" from the previous month." 7
A comparison of mobile penetration rates and mobile telephone use
across countries reveals the marginal effect of a particular mobile
termination regime. Low minutes of use ("MOUs") in Europe and other
CPP markets are partly attributable to the relatively large share of prepaid
subscribers, who may not be able to afford to use more than their allocated
number of minutes. High MOUs in the United States are attributable to the
adoption of bucket plans and the associated low rates per minute." 8 Table
2 summarizes these data.
114 FCC Eighth Annual Report, supra note 19, 213.
115 Id.
116 Nextel, Nextel National Free Incoming Plans, at
http://www.nextel.com/phones_plans/promos/promo free incoming.shtml (last visited Apr. 17, 2004).
117 The U.S. wireless carrier Cingular introduced a rollover plan in 2002, which credits
customers for minutes not used in previous months. See Jesse Drucker, How To Dump Your Cellphone
Company, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2003, at D4.
118 Clearly, these large bucket plans do not reduce the marginal cost of a minute of use to
zero, but the low prices available in the larger bucket plans have reduced the cost of accepting
incoming calls substantially. In addition, the large number of free off-peak minutes available in many
of these plans further reduces the cost of accepting calls in the U.S.'s MPP regime.
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Table 2: Penetration and Usage of Mobile
Telephony in Selected Countries
Country Penetration Share of Minutes Revenue
(% of Prepaid of Use per per
Population) (% of Sub- Subscriber Minute
scribers) per Month ($)
CPP
Australia 68 NA 173 0.16
Finland 85 NA 146 0.24
France 63 NA 156 0.20
Germany* 72 54 72 0.29
Italy 93 NA 121 0.20
Japan 62 3 170 0.30
South Korea 68 1 296 0.10
United Kingdom 85 69 132 0.22
Range 62-93 1-69 72-296 0.10-0.30
MPP
Canada 37 NA 270 0.11
United States 49 5 458 0.12
Range 37-49 5 270-458 0.11-0.12
Source: FCC Eighth Annual Report, supra note 19, at D-14.
* MTRs are not regulated in Germany.
As Table 2 shows, average MOUs per subscriber per month are 270
in Canada and 458 in the United States, while MOUs per subscriber per
month in the eight CPP countries in Table 2 range from 72 to 296. On the
other hand, CPP systems are associated with higher penetration rates,
perhaps because they are used in countries with metered local calling
charges on the fixed network that encourage mobile adoption. The
penetration rate across the eight CPP countries in Table 2 ranges from
sixty-two to ninety-three percent. However, the United States is reducing
this gap, as Figure 2 shows. The growth rate in mobile penetration in the
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Source: FCC Eighth Annual Report, supra note 19, at app. D; CANADIAN WIRELESS TELECOMMS.
ASS'N, WIRELESS SUBSCRIBER STATISTICS, available at
http://www.cwtaca/industryguide/SubscribersStatsQ2_03.pdf (last visited Apr. 26,2004).
Indeed, if the growth rate continues to follow this S-shape pattern,
mobile penetration in the United States should equal the penetration rates
realized in most CPP countries between 2008 and 2014.9 The growth in
mobile subscribers in Canada is similarly impressive-26.8 percent in
2000, 22.3 percent in 2001, and 11.8 percent growth in 2002.20
The fact that mobile penetration in Canada and the United States will
likely equal the penetration rates of CPP countries in the near term calls
into question the conventional wisdom that CPP is the superior regulatory
choice. The apparent primary advantage of CPP relative to MPP has been
higher penetration rates; but, if that perceived advantage disappears, then
how can CPP be considered superior to MPP? Mobile subscribers in MPP
countries appear to use their mobile phones more intensively, presumably
because of the pricing structure that MPP elicits from competitive MNOs.
119 By fitting a Gompertz S-curve to the data, we estimate that penetration will reach 85
percent by 2014. By fitting a Pearl S-curve to the data, we estimate that penetration will reach 85
percent by 2008. The Pearl model has a slightly higher R-squared than the Gompertz model (0.995
versus 0.992). For an explanation of these estimation techniques, see Peg Young & J. Keith Ord,
Model Selection and Estimation for Technological Growth Curves, 5 INT'L J. FORECASTING 501
(1989).
120 CANADIAN WIRELESS TELECOMMS. ASS'N, WIRELESS SUBSCRIBER STATISTICS,
available at http://www.cwta.ca/industryguide/SubscribersStatsQ2L03.pdf (last visited Apr. 26,
2004).
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Moreover, the data suggest that MPP creates better incentives than CPP for
MNOs to lower fixed-to-mobile termination rates. As Table 2 shows, the
average revenue per minute in the United Kingdom is nearly twice the
average revenue per minute in Canada and the United States ($0.220
versus $0.115). The higher prices in CPP countries (which are a weighted
average of mobile-to-mobile, mobile-to-fixed, and fixed-to-mobile rates)
may be attributable to the higher fixed-to-mobile termination rates.
Because high minutes of use and low mobile termination rates contribute
positively to the welfare of mobile subscribers, there is a strong case for
policymakers to choose MPP over CPP.
121
II. Forces That Constrain an MNO's Market Power
Market power exists in any industry characterized by imperfect
competition. Hence, a demonstration of market power alone cannot justify
regulatory intervention. It is the degree of market power that should
interest regulators. In mobile telephony, multiple forces serve to constrain
the market power of MNOs in the pricing of mobile termination. We now
discuss those constraining forces and consider the extent to which MNOs
have the ability to exploit market power.
A. Demand Substitutes for Fixed-to-Mobile Calls
The existence of substitutes constrains the market power of an MNO
in the pricing of mobile termination. Demand substitutes for fixed-to-
mobile calls include mobile-to-mobile calls, mobile-to-fixed calls, data
messages, and fixed-to-fixed calls.
1. Mobile-to-Mobile Calls
As mobile penetration increases, so does the percentage of people
with a fixed phone who have access to a mobile telephone. This growing
subscribership of wireless makes mobile-to-mobile calls an increasingly
feasible substitute for fixed-to-mobile calls. Mobile-to-mobile calls on the
same network (on-net) are not subject to a termination charge. As a result,
an on-net call can often be less expensive than a fixed-to-mobile call,
making the former an attractive substitute for the latter. The mobile carrier
121 Charles Jackson has suggested to us that economic welfare might improve if consumers
were offered a choice of CPP or MPP. A similar choice already exists in most countries for the use of
the land-line network. We agree that this added choice could create value for consumers, but
implementing two different call-payment regimes might create confusion among wireless customers
over who bears the cost of terminating each call. Carriers would have to develop software that notifies




loses the termination charge when the consumer switches from a fixed-to-
mobile call to an on-net mobile-to-mobile call, although the MNO gains
the origination charge on the latter.
On the other hand, mobile-to-mobile calls from one network to
another (off-net) are subject to a termination charge and are usually more
expensive than fixed-to-mobile calls. Therefore, off-net mobile-to-mobile
calls are not generally a good substitute for fixed-to-mobile calls. The
MNO does not lose the termination charge when the consumer switches
from a fixed-to-mobile call to an off-net mobile-to-mobile call.
Consequently, the constraining effect on mobile termination rates
resulting from the ability of mobile-to-mobile calls to substitute for fixed-
to-mobile calls depends on the degree of mobile market penetration and
the likelihood that the calling party and the called party are on the same
mobile network. Although the constraining effect increases with the
mobile penetration rate, it does not require, as Australian regulators
incorrectly claimed, a "full penetration rate of mobile phones" for
substitution to mobile-to-mobile calls to be an effective constraint on
mobile termination rates.1 22 Substitution need only occur at a "critical
share" of customers--that is, to a degree making a price increase
unprofitable for the MNO.123 Depending upon the price-cost margins and
the price elasticity of demand, the critical share of customers required to
defeat, say, a five-percent price increase can be very small. Especially in
industries in which a considerable proportion of costs are fixed-and
therefore any revenue change directly affects the bottom line-it will be
necessary for only a small number of customers to switch to a substitute to
render a price increase unprofitable.
Empirical evidence suggests that higher mobile penetration rates and
lower mobile prices have already caused a significant subset of consumers
to consider their mobile telephones to be their main phones and a
substitute for fixed lines. 124 A study conducted by the U.K. consultancy
DotEcon in 2001 found significant evidence of call substitution between
fixed and mobile telephony based on a telephone survey of more than
7,000 U.K. residents.' 25 Call substitution is defined as customers with
access to both fixed and mobile phones choosing which mode to use on the
122 ACCC 2001 STUDY, supra note 18, at 44 (stating that "less than full penetration of
mobile phones" might limit substitution possibilities).
123 For a more extensive discussion of critical share, see Jerry A. Hausman, Gregory Leonard
& Christopher Vellturo, Market Definition Under Price Discrimination, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 367
(1996).
124 Ofrel, however, regards the perception of a mobile as complementary to a fixed line as a
factor reducing the substitution rate. See OFTEL STUDY, supra note 23, at 8.
125 DOTECON, FIXED-MOBILE SUBSTITUTION vii (Sept. 2001), available at
http://www.dotecon.comlimages/reports/fmsub3.pdf [hereinafter DOTECON FIXED-TO-MOBILE
STUDY].
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basis of the relative price of a call. Call substitution is distinct from access-
level substitution, which involves customers choosing to make or retain
subscriptions to fixed or mobile services depending on the relative prices
of these services. These two substitutions are linked, as more call
substitution will reduce the value of subscribing to a fixed line and thus
lead to access-level substitution at the margin. 12 6 Indeed, the ITU reported
that mobile subscribers overtook fixed-line subscribers worldwide in
2002.127
DotEcon found that more than forty percent of those consumers with
access to both fixed and mobile telephones at home use their mobiles to
make calls from home at least sometimes, with the predominant reason
being that mobile calls are cheaper than fixed calls.128 Mobile adoption
would more often reduce fixed line usage than increase it; and, given
hypothetical scenarios about the pricing of fixed and mobile services,
respondents would switch both call and subscription decisions in response
to relative price changes. 129 Finally, DotEcon concluded from its
comparative analysis of twenty OECD countries that an increase in mobile
penetration has a significant negative impact on the growth of fixed-line
penetration.
30
One objection that Oftel raised against the hypothesis that on-net
substitution constrains mobile termination rates is that any substitution to
on-net calls could actually increase termination rates, as MNOs could meet
the requirements of their more price-sensitive consumers through lower
on-net call prices while raising termination rates for others. 131 However,
such an example of inverse-elasticity pricing is generally considered to
increase efficiency. 132 Oftel's objection thus rests only on distributional
concerns, not on economic efficiency concerns.
2. Mobile-to-Fixed Calls
A second substitute for a fixed-to-mobile call is a reversal in the
direction of the call. This substitution can be achieved by an informal
126 Id
127 Robert Shaw, Int'l Telecomms. Union, Mobile Overtakes Fixed: What Happens Next?,
Presentation to Seminar on Economic and Market Analysis for Central and Eastern European
Countries and Baltic States, slides 10-13 (Sept. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.itu.intlosg/spu/presentations/2003/prague-presentation-mobie-overtakes-ixed.pdf Mobile
penetration exceeds fixed-line penetration in several countries, including Cambodia, China, the Czech
Republic, Morocco, Paraguay, Sweden, and Taiwan. Id. at 13.
128 DOTECON FIXED-TO-MOBILE STUDY, supra note 125, at 10, 59 figs.30-31.
129 Id. at 10, 60 fig.32.
130 Id. at 30. Using a regression analysis, DotEcon estimated the relationship between the
rate of growth of fixed-line penetration and mobile penetration, controlling for other factors that might
influence fixed-line penetration.
131 OFTEL STUDY, supra note 23, at 8.
132 We discuss Ramsey pricing in Part III.
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agreement between the calling parties whereby the calling party asks the
receiving party to call back, or by a third-party vendor that automatically
reverses the direction of the call. This alternative is contingent on the
mobile party's consent, because the mobile party must pay the mobile
origination charge under this alternative.
A reversal of the direction of the call results in the mobile network's
losing the termination charge while gaining the origination charge. Mobile
origination rates are likely to be lower than mobile termination rates, as
competition between MNOs is likely to have a larger effect on origination
rates than on termination rates. Consequently, the mobile network loses
revenue on balance by receiving the origination charge instead of the
termination charge.
Oftel and the ACCC have considered and rejected the theory that call
reversal is an important substitute for fixed-to-mobile calls, but they have
done so without any in-depth analysis. 33 The degree to which call-back
will constrain MNOs will depend on the calling party's awareness of the
mobile termination rate and the degree to which mobile subscribers will
consent to reversing the direction of the call.
By analogy, automatic call-back services became a significant
constraint on high rates over particular international routes. 134 The
experience of the Hong Kong Telephone Company ("HKTC") is
illuminating. Cable & Wireless, the parent of HKTC, was willing to accept
government compensation to surrender its "monopoly" over international
outbound calls in Hong Kong earlier than provided for in the company's
concession because call-back services had substantially eroded revenues.
Hence, Cable & Wireless came to value its exclusive franchise less than
the net cash flows that the Hong Kong government apparently believed
HKTC would earn on outbound calls.
35
3. Data Messages
A data message (of up to 160 characters) can be sent from a computer
or a mobile telephone to another mobile telephone. Data messages have
the potential to substitute for fixed-to-mobile calls, because they also allow
the caller to have immediate access to the receiver. To send a data
133 ACCC2001 STUDY, supra note 18, at 18; OFTEL STUDY, supra note 23, at 8.
134 For a U.S. regulatory perspective on the competitive effect of international call-back, see
VIA USA, Ltd., 9 F.C.C.R. 2288 3 (1994) (granting applications for authority to operate as
international resale carriers), affd on reconsideration, 10 F.C.C.R. 9540 3 (1995). Additional
information on call-back can be downloaded from FCC, International Bureau: Call-Back Services, at
http://www.fcc.gov/ib/pd/pf/call-back.html (last visited Apr. 17,2004).
135 For an elaboration of the Hong Kong experience with call-back services, see Paul W.
MacAvoy & J. Gregory Sidak, What is Wrong with American Telecommunications?, in COMPETITION
AND REGULATION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS EXAMINING GERMANY AND AMERICA 69, 73-74 (J.
Gregory Sidak, Christoph Engel & Guenter Knieps eds., 2001).
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message, the caller needs to have access to a mobile telephone or to the
Internet. Data messages are a good substitute for fixed-to-mobile calls to
convey a specific piece of information, such as the time and place of a
meeting. They can also be used to arrange call back by informing the
called party of the request for a telephone conversation.
Data messages, however, are abbreviated. Moreover, they are not
conveyed in real time. Despite these differences, data messages likely
constrain fixed-to-mobile termination rates. As noted earlier, it is
unnecessary for all customers to switch services in response to a price
increase to constrain the price of termination rates. Consumers must
substitute only to a degree that causes the price increase to be unprofitable
for the MNO. Empirical evidence indicates that a significant share of
mobile users reduce their reliance on voice calls in response to an increase
in text messaging. 36 This evidence supports the claim that such
substitution indeed occurs.
Finally, firms that offer VOIP will pay the off-net mobile-to-mobile
termination charge, not the fixed-to-mobile termination charge. 137 Without
having to subsidize handsets, VOIP offerings could cannibalize the
existing fixed-to-mobile termination traffic and thus force the fixed-to-
mobile termination rate downward.
4. Fixed-to-Fixed Calls
Fixed-to-fixed calls do not allow the calling party to contact the
mobile subscriber in real time when the mobile subscriber is not near a
fixed-line connection. 38 Nevertheless, fixed-to-fixed calls still could be a
substitute for fixed-to-mobile calls. If the fixed-to-mobile call is not time-
sensitive, consumers will be willing to wait until the called party can be
reached through a fixed connection. In that case, the mobile network loses
the termination charge.
5. Routing Fixed-to-Mobile Calls Through Mobile Networks
In the United Kingdom, one or more firms began offering a service
that would allow "GSM gateways" to route automatically a fixed-to-
mobile call through a domestic mobile network. To the MNO providing
136 DOTECON FIXED-TO-MOBILE STUDY, supra note 125, at 10, 68 fig.44.
137 See Tommaso Valletti, Obligations that Can Be Imposed on Operators with Significant
Market Power under the New Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications 14 (Sept. 2003)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation), available at
http://europaeu.int/information-society/topics/ecomm/doc/useful-information/library/studies-ext con
sult/economic-expertgroup/mobile%20_valletti-final.pdf, text accompanying supra note 74.
138 A fixed-to-fixed call does allow the calling party to leave a message for the mobile
subscriber, which can be returned from a fixed line or mobile line.
Vol. 21:261, 2004
Mobile Networks
termination, the call appeared to originate on-net. As a consequence, the
terminating MNO would charge the caller the on-net mobile-to-mobile
termination rate, which in the United Kingdom was lower than the fixed-
to-mobile termination rate. This particular service, however, did not last.
In July 2003, the U.K. Radiocommunications Agency effectively shut
down the service by ruling that it was unlawful for the firms offering the
service to use spectrum allocated to mobile services in fixed
applications.'
39
This anecdote shows that entrepreneurs can emerge to offer automatic
arbitrage services to evade high fixed-to-mobile termination rates.
Whether they do so is not a question of technology but rather a question of
the size of the spread between the fixed-to-mobile termination rate and (in
this case) the mobile-to-mobile termination rate. This actual experience
blunts the force of Oftel's related criticism that automatic arbitrage
services had not developed to facilitate mobile-to-fixed call-back.
6. Other Services
Other services that could be potential substitutes for fixed-to-mobile
calls include e-mail, fax, paging, and voicemail. Paging can be used in
much the same way as data messages to arrange call back. It does require
the called party to own a pager. E-mail allows the calling party to send
more complex messages to the called party than data messages permit.
Although e-mail requires the calling party to access a computer-and the
called party to have either computer access, or a mobile telephone or pager
enabling him to receive e-mails-it is a substitute for a fixed-to-mobile
call. Finally, fixed-line callers can leave extended voicemail messages on a
mobile subscriber's fixed-line network. When the mobile subscriber
checks those messages, he can return the call from his mobile phone or
from his fixed-line connection.
B. The Effect of Termination Rates on the Subscriber's Inbound Calls
The preceding discussion demonstrates that fixed-line callers can
substitute other forms of communication for calls to mobile subscribers in
response to high mobile termination rates. Of course, fixed-line callers can
also elect not to call mobile customers, or, at a minimum, can elect to
decrease their demand for calling mobile customers. The elasticity of
demand for fixed-to-mobile calls captures all substitution possibilities,
including electing not to make contact. From the mobile operator's
139 For discussion and analysis, see Reinhard Schu, GSM Gateways and Other "Fixed
Mobile" Terminals Partly Legalized in the UK, ARNOLD & PORTER EUROPEAN TELECOMS NEWSL.,
July 18, 2003, available at http://aporter.pair.com/newsletter/gsm_gateways.pdf.
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perspective, the decision not to call a mobile subscriber is just as harmful
as the decision to substitute to another form of communication. In
particular, an MNO loses the entire margin of terminating a call onto its
mobile network when a fixed-line caller decreases his demand to contact a
mobile customer. Moreover, if mobile subscribers know that they will not
receive calls from persons from whom they want to hear, the demand for
mobile subscriptions will decline, which will further decrease the MNO's
profits. Recognizing that potential loss, MNOs will moderate their pricing
of mobile termination rates.
To evaluate the own-price elasticity of demand for fixed-to-mobile
calls, one must distinguish between the market elasticity for fixed-to-
mobile calls and the elasticity of demand for calls to a particular network.
The former describes the degree to which consumers will abstain from
fixed-to-mobile calls entirely and switch to other means in response to an
increase in the average market price for fixed-to-mobile calls. The latter
describes the consumer reaction to an increase in the price of calling a
particular mobile network. This latter demand elasticity is what an
individual MNO will consider when setting its fixed-to-mobile termination
rate and is likely to be substantially higher.
A study conducted by DotEcon for British Telecom ("BT") estimated
that the long-run market demand elasticity for fixed-to-mobile calls was
between -0.33 and -0.42 for daytime calls. Hence, the volume of fixed-to-
mobile calls would fall by about 0.4% for a 1% increase in the retail
price. 14 DotEcon found that market demand elasticities were higher for
evening and weekend calls. The weighted average demand elasticity was
estimated to be -0.43. T4 On the other hand, a U.S. study found the own-
price elasticity of demand for wireless calls to be -1.12 to -1.29, which
suggests that an MPP regime will discipline carrier termination charges in
a competitive wireless market.
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When considering whether to raise the price of fixed-to-mobile
termination rate by ten percent, a hypothetical monopolist of the mobile
network would have to weigh the lost margins on four percent of its
inbound calls from fixed networks (the marginal calls) against the increase
in margins on ninety-six percent of its existing calls (the inframarginal
calls). Because the elasticity of demand is higher for any individual
140 DOTECON, ESTIMATION OF FIXED TO MOBILE PRICE ELASTICITIES 3 (2001), available at
www.dotecon.com/images/reports/elastfn.pdf [hereinafter DOTECON ELASTICITY STUDY].
141 DOTECON, OPTIMAL FIXED-TO-MOBILE INTERCONNECTION CHARGES 12 (2001),
available at http://www.dotecon.com/images/reports/rmsyits.pdf [hereinafter DOTECON OPTIMAL
CHARGES STUDY].
142 Allan T. Ingraham & J. Gregory Sidak, Do States Tax Wireless Services Inefficiently?
Evidence on the Price Elasticity of Demand (Mar. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the





competitive MNO, the incentive to raise the termination charge will be
even less than that facing the hypothetical monopolist.
A hypothetical monopolist of the mobile network would expect to lose
an even greater share of marginal customers in the mid-to-long term. The
demand for any service is more price-inelastic in the short run. Thus, the
price elasticity of demand for fixed-to-mobile calls should increase (in
absolute terms) over time, further constraining the market power of MNOs
vis-i-vis fixed-line callers. 143 As we discussed above, text messaging and
other innovative forms of communications will provide new substitution
possibilities for fixed-to-mobile calls. Moreover, search costs and
customer ignorance decline over time, further increasing the price
elasticity of demand for fixed-to-mobile calls. As fixed-line consumers
learn more about their calling options, they will become more price-
sensitive. NRAs should not assume that there are no learning effects when
deciding whether to regulate mobile termination rates.
C. Closed User Groups: Mobile Customers' Concern for the Welfare of
Their Callers
An MNO can exercise market power only to the extent that its mobile
subscribers are not sensitive to the price of incoming calls. If, to the
contrary, enough customers choose their wireless carrier on the basis of
incoming call charges, then the MNO will have an incentive to compete on
mobile termination rates also. Although some evidence suggests that
mobile subscribers are generally less concerned with the cost of incoming
calls than with the price of outgoing calls,' 44 it is doubtful that consumers
are ignorant about mobile termination rates and their dampening effects on
incoming calls.
In general, the demand responses of calling parties in reaction to an
increase in mobile termination rates will affect the mobile subscriber. If
higher mobile termination rates reduce the incentives of other parties to
call the mobile subscriber, the value of wireless access for the called party
will decline. Consequently, higher mobile termination rates will increase
the wireless subscribers' propensity to switch networks.
Research cited by Oftel indicates that thirteen percent of residential
customers take into account incoming call charges when they buy their
mobile packages. 145 By contrast, thirty-one percent of small and medium
enterprise business consumers consider the cheapest network to call when
143 Greater substitution possibilities increase the price elasticity of demand over time. See,
e.g., GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 32 (3d ed. 1978) ("A particular brand of coffee has a
high cross-elasticity with respect to other brands-actually, on the order of +5 or +1O--even within a
month or two.") (emphasis added).
144 OFTEL STUDY, supra note 23, at 5.
145 Id.
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choosing a network. 46 However, Oftel's research also showed that, when
choosing a network, both residential and business consumers tend to
consider other factors-such as the price for outgoing calls, network
coverage, and the choice of handset-to be more important than the price
of incoming calls. 47
A closed user group ("CUG") is generally defined as a group of
subscribers who are as concerned about the price of receiving a call as the
price of making a mobile call.148 Other definitions distinguish between a
narrow CUG, in which the mobile owner is also the person who pays for
the calls to its mobile, and a wide CUG, where a group of friends and
family have an interest in keeping call costs down in general.149 An
example of a narrow CUG is a family whose children call their parents'
mobile phones, for which the parents pay the charges originating from
both the fixed line and the mobile. Wider CUGs exist both in the private
context, where a group of friends and family does not want to impose high
costs on one another, and in the business context. In either case, the mobile
subscriber's utility depends partly on the utility of his callers. The mobile
subscriber has a substantial interest in minimizing rates paid by calling
parties who are clients or potential sources of business.1 50 Furthermore,
business mobile subscribers form a narrow CUG when employees of a
firm call each other. In this case, the company will have to pay for both the
calling party's and the called party's phone bill. 5'
The consequence of a CUG is that mobile subscribers will pay
attention to the prices of incoming calls when choosing their mobile
networks, thus placing competitive pressure on MNOs to keep termination
rates low. Mobile subscribers in a CUG will also consider switching to a
different MNO in response to an increase in the incoming call charges.
The latter effect, however, would be constrained if mobile service
contracts limit the subscriber's ability to switch networks immediately or if




148 ACCC 2001 STUDY, supra note 18, at 17.
149 OFTEL STUDY, supra note 23, at 6.
150 Several parties raised this argument in Calling Party Pays Service Offerings in the
Commercial Mobile Services, WT Dkt. No. 97-207, 14 F.C.C.R. 10,861 (1999). See, e.g., COMMENTS
OF BELL ATLANTIC IN THE MATTER OF CALLING PARTY PAYS SERVICE OFFERINGS IN THE
COMMERCIAL MOBILE SERVICES, WT Dkt. No. 97-207, at 5 (Sept. 17, 1999), available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retieve.cgi?native-or pdf =pdf&id-document-6009451163.
151 A related economic literature examines multi-sided platform markets, in which platform
providers must account for the interactions among the demands of multiple groups of customers. See
Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Pla(form Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EuR. ECON.
ASS'N 990 (2003). For an application of the theory to the credit card industry, see David S. Evans, The
Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE. J. ON REG. 325 (2003).
152 Another argument raised against the constraining effect of CUGs on termination rates is
that MNOs can differentiate these particular groups by charging them lower prices, whereas prices for
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Using a theoretical model of mobile telephony that assumes that all fixed
costs are defrayed through fixed monthly charges, Mark Armstrong
concludes that, when mobile customers do not internalize the welfare of
their callers, regulation of mobile termination rates improves economic
welfare:
[Total welfare] is maximized by setting [the termination charge] equal to
[the marginal cost for terminating calls from the fixed sector], so that
there should be marginal cost pricing of call termination under our
assumptions. This in turn implies that [the fixed charge for mobile
subscribers] equals [the fixed cost per mobile subscriber] in equilibrium,
and there are no handset or other subsidies for mobile network
connection at the optimum. Although mobile subscribers certainly
benefit from high termination charges-since network connection is
subsidized as a result-this benefit is more than outweighed by the costs
this imposes on their callers. 1
53
Armstrong shows that this result is true even in the face of call
externalities-that is, when mobile subscribers gain utility from receiving
a call.154 When one allows for mobile subscribers to care about their
callers, however, competition among MNOs will result in termination rates
roughly equal to marginal cost.' 5 Hence, when mobile customers fully
internalize the welfare of their callers, Armstrong acknowledges that "the
need for the control of mobile call termination in a competitive market is
much reduced."' 156 The relevant policy question, which we discuss in a
later section, is whether regulatory intervention could improve the
outcome regardless of the degree to which subscribers internalize the
welfare of their callers.
D. Supply Substitution
Entering the mobile telephone business requires significant
investment in network fixed assets. To terminate a call to a mobile
subscriber, any operator needs access to the details of the subscriber's
subscriber identity module ("SIM") card. This information is currently
held only by that subscriber's MNO, so that any third-party termination
service would require information sharing, an outcome that Oftel
considered unlikely. 57  Additionally, the development of other
other customers would remain unaffected or would even increase. See OFTEL STUDY, supra note 23, at
6-7.
153 Armstrong, supra note 13, at 341.
154 Id. at 341-42.
155 Id. at 344.
156 Id.
157 OFTEL STUDY, supra note 23, at 11.
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technological solutions that achieve the same result-such as wireless
local area networks or mobile virtual network operators-is uncertain. The
low general likelihood of supply-substitution does not mean that potential
supply-side effects have no constraining effect on mobile termination
rates. We explain later why MNOs could have a strong incentive to
differentiate themselves by offering service bundles to wireless subscribers
that include low charges for incoming fixed-to-mobile calls.
E. The Effect of Mobile Affiliation with a Fixed Network
The economic theory of "double marginalization" explains why, in
any given geographic market, an MNO affiliated with the fixed-network
carrier will have a lower fixed-to-mobile termination rates than will
unaffiliated MNOs. 58 Double marginalization occurs when two companies
have a vertical supplier-customer relationship. The upstream company sets
its price, and thus its margin between price and marginal cost, to maximize
its own profits. The downstream company likewise sets its price and
margin to maximize its profit, treating what it pays the upstream company
as a cost. If the upstream company begins to offer the downstream product
also, it generally will set the final price of the downstream product to
maximize its profits jointly from both the upstream and downstream
products. The company offering the combined product will often find that
it can increase its profits by lowering the price of the final product below
the price that would be set in the previous situation. The company offering
the combined product will take into account how a lower price on the final
product will increase the sale of and profits from the upstream product,
while a company offering only the final product will not.
In the United Kingdom, for example, by mid-1999 the mobile
termination rates on calls from BT's fixed network to BT Cellnet's mobile
network were slightly lower than those to Vodafone's mobile network and
considerably lower than those to Orange's and One2One's mobile
networks. 5 9 One would not observe this result, however, in countries
where the incumbent fixed-network operator is legally required to charge
the same retail price for outgoing calls to all mobile networks, whether or
not they are affiliates of the operator. In Denmark, for example, fixed and
mobile operators negotiate interconnection agreements between their
158 See Joseph Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347,
351-52 (1950). For a contemporary exposition, see DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF,
MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 398-401 (3d ed. 2000); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 174 (1988).
159 WORKING PARTY ON TELECOMM. & INFO. SERVS. POLICIES, ORG. FOR ECON.
COOPERATION & DEV., CELLULAR MOBILE PRICING STRUCTURES AND TRENDS 50 (May 19, 2000),





networks, but TeleDenmark, the incumbent fixed-network operator that
sets the retail price for fixed-to-mobile calls, is barred from differentiating
prices for calls to mobile networks.'
60
F. Summary of Forces That Constrain an MNO's Market Power
Several forces constrain an MNO's market power in the provision of
terminating access to mobile networks. Substitution possibilities for fixed-
to-mobile calls increase the elasticity of demand for fixed-line callers. By
eliminating the double-marginalization problem, vertical integration of
fixed-line operators into mobile services should lower fixed-to-mobile
rates. Moreover, mobile customers partially internalize the welfare of their
callers, which diminishes the economic justification for regulating mobile
call termination.
III. If Market Failure Is Thought To Exist in Fixed-to-Mobile
Termination, Are Price Controls the Socially Optimal Remedy?
Should mobile rates, including termination rates, be set to equal
marginal cost? We explain in this Part why such pricing would be
unsustainable. In an industry that is characterized by high fixed costs,
MNOs must charge prices that exceed marginal cost to make contributions
to the recovery of overhead. This need to depart from marginal-cost
pricing underlies the theory of Ramsey pricing.' 6 1 What, then, is the
likelihood that regulators could set mobile termination rates that departed
from marginal cost to the socially optimal degree? U.S. regulators
similarly attempted-at great cost and with limited success-to determine
the total element long-run incremental cost ("TELRIC") of fixed-line
operators in the United States. That experience suggests that the search for
the socially optimal mobile termination rate presents regulators with
several insoluble empirical and practical problems.
A. The Recovery of Large Fixed Network Costs and Customer
Acquisition Costs Through Variable Charges
Mobile telecommunications services require that MNOs incur
significant fixed and common costs before the customer begins to make
revenue contributions. For example, MNOs typically purchase licenses
160 Id. at47.
161 See William J. Baumol & David F. Bradford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost
Pricing, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 265 (1970); Mark Boiteux, On the Management of Public Monopolies, 24
ECONOMETRICA 22 (1956); Frank P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J.
47 (1927). For a nontechnical exposition of Ramsey pricing, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY
SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL TELEPHONY 35-40 (1994).
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from governments that convey the right to offer mobile service on
designated frequencies. In a January 2001 auction for spectrum in the
United States, MNOs paid nearly $5 per MHzPop-or $1500 per potential
customer-for the typical 30 MHz of bandwidth used for mobile
networks. 162 The price of spectrum in some European 3G spectrum
auctions was even higher.163 Even though spectrum prices have declined
from the $1500 high-water mark, current spectrum values imply a cost of
spectrum that is equal to $500 per expected subscriber.16 A U.S. mobile
carrier therefore must expect at least $500 in the present discounted value
of net cash flow over the life of the customer relationship simply to cover
spectrum costs.
In addition to these upfront expenditures, MNOs incur significant
subscriber acquisition costs ("SAC") through marketing expenses and
handset subsidies. In accounting terms, the SAC is the cost of sale, which
does not include advertising costs. The largest portion of an operator's
SAC is the commission paid to the dealer and subsidies on handsets.
165
Vodafone estimated that the average cost to connect a new customer in
Japan in 2002 was $290.66 According to one U.S. analyst, from 2001 to
2002, wireless carriers' handset subsidies in the United States increased by
eighteen percent, from $3.8 billion to $4.5 billion. 67 As of 2003, handset
subsidies accounted for one-third of the $350 that U.S. wireless carriers
spend on average to sign up each new subscriber.
168
In a perfectly competitive market, any firm is condemned to earn (no
more than) zero economic profit in the long run, allowing it only to cover
its current expenses, to pay interest to its creditors, and to provide a return
to equity holders that is consistent with the prevailing level of interest
payments so as to attract new capital. 169 If the overall market for mobile
services were effectively competitive (so that no excess profits were being
earned), above-cost access prices for mobile termination would simply
162 The results of the auction can be downloaded from the FCC's web site at
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/35/charts/35market.xs (last visited Apr. 27, 2004) (MHzPOP connotes
a megahertz of radio frequency provided to 1000 persons).
163 See, e.g., Paul Klemperer, How (Not) To Run an Auction: The European 3G Auctions, 46
EUR. ECON. REV. 829, 830 (2002) (showing that 3G spectrum prices per capita were E615 in Germany
and E650 in the United Kingdom).
164 Assuming that (1) only 50 percent of potential customers will be converted into mobile
subscribers, (2) the price of spectrum has decreased by two-thirds to $50 per potential customer for 30
MHz of bandwidth, and (3) the mobile subscribers will be divided evenly across five carriers, the
implied fixed cost per subscriber for 30 MHz of spectrum is $500 (equal to $50 divided by 0.1).
165 It's Payback Time, TOTAL TELECOM, Apr. 2003, at 2.
166 Id.
167 Olga Kharif, So Long Fat Cell-Phone Subsidies?, Bus. WEEK ONLINE, Feb. 13, 2003, at
1, available at 2003 WL 6951835 (citing Martin Dunsby, vice-president at wireless consultancy
InCode Telecom in La Jolla, California).
168 Id.
169 BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note 161, at 30.
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offset the below-cost retail prices for other parts of the mobile services
bundle-such as outgoing calls, mobile-to-mobile calls, or access
charges.17° In this case, any (potential) excess profit made on termination
by one mobile service would be competed away by other mobile services,
effectively returning it to consumers.
An MNO could levy a large surcharge to recoup the average fixed
cost when customers join its network. 17 1 This pricing alternative, however,
would reduce mobile penetration substantially and would be resisted by an
MNO whose competitors are subsidizing handsets. In any event, it is not
reasonable to believe that regulators (or consumers themselves) would
tolerate an explicit surcharge for new mobile customers. The only viable
pricing system, it appears, is to charge mobile usage rates that exceed
marginal cost.
B. The Role of Network Externalities in Mobile Telecommunications
If the price for terminating a fixed-to-mobile call exceeds the cost of
providing such termination, that fact alone would not mean that such
pricing is inefficient. The existence of network externalities in mobile
telecommunications could justify above-cost pricing. Network
externalities in mobile services exist because a consumer's mobile
subscription has a positive effect on other parties (both fixed and mobile
subscribers).'72 These parties benefit in various ways from the decision of
a consumer to subscribe to mobile service. They benefit from any call they
can place to the new subscriber. They also benefit from any call that the
new subscriber places to them. Additionally, they benefit from the ability
to contact, and to be contacted by, the new subscriber-the so-called
"option value." This option value is in addition to the value that the parties
place on the actual call as they exercise the option. Since callers to mobiles
therefore benefit from the called party's decision to subscribe to a mobile
network, the economically efficient charge they pay for the call must
reflect this benefit. 173 On the other hand, if the mobile subscriber were to
face the full costs of the termination, he or she would be less likely to
subscribe to the mobile service-even in situations in which such a
subscription would enhance overall economic welfare due to the positive
externalities obtained.
The difficult question is how to value the network externality. This
170 See ACCC 2001 STUDY, supra note 18; OFTEL STUDY, supra note 23, at 22.
171 This surcharge would be difficult to implement in practice because the average fixed
spectrum cost declines with the number of subscribers enrolled.
172 Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75
AM. ECON. REv. 424 (1985); Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of
Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822, 823 (1986).
173 Oftel agrees with this assumption. OFTEL STUDY, supra note 23, at 37.
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valuation determines whether the difference between the price and the
costs of fixed-to-mobile termination can be explained as a reflection of the
network externality or instead as an exercise of market power by MNOs.
Economists Jeffrey Rohlfs and James M. Griffin have suggested an
approach that can be used to provide lower and upper bounds for the value
of the network externality. 174 They explain that the ratio of marginal social
benefit to marginal private benefit-the Rohlfs-Griffin factor-is likely to
lie in the range of one to two. Provided that the social benefits from
additional joiners to the network are positive, the Rohlfs-Griffin factor
cannot be below one. The upper bound of the Rohlfs-Griffin factor is two
because it is unlikely that the existing members of the network will benefit
by a greater amount than the potential new subscriber would..
Oftel's determination of the fixed-to-mobile termination rate was
based on consultation from Rohlfs, whose early work at Bell Labs on
network externalities resulted in the eventual publication of the seminal
paper on the subject.175 In particular, Oftel assumed that the Rohlfs-Griffin
factor is between 1.3 and 1.7. 176 Because this new subscriber can be
reached over the fixed network, Oftel reasoned, some of the benefits to
existing network members of being able to contact a new subscriber have
already been captured.
177
In his theoretical model of optimal mobile termination rates,
Armstrong allows for consumer surplus in the fixed-line sector to be an
increasing linear function of the number of mobile subscribers. 178 He finds
that the termination charge that maximizes total welfare under network
externalities exceeds the marginal cost of termination:
[A] higher termination charge raises the equilibrium mobile subscriber
utility via handset subsidies and the like, this in turn increases mobile
subscription, which in turn raises the utility of fixed network subscribers
because of the network externality effect.
179
Armstrong concludes that the presence of network externalities provides a
reason for pricing call termination above cost. Total welfare is greater
when the prices of mobile handsets are subsidized by revenues from
above-cost pricing for call termination, because an increase in the number
of mobile subscribers enhances the value of the fixed network to all
174 See JEFFREY ROHLFS, ECONOMICALLY EFFICIENT BELL-SYSTEM PRICING 16 (Bell Lab.
Discussion Paper No. 138, 1979); James M. Griffin, Welfare Implications of Externalities and Price
Elasticities for Telecommunications Pricing, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 59, 64 (1982).
175 Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for Communication Services, 5 BELL
J. ECON. 16 (1974).
176 OFTEL STUDY, supra note 23, at 66-67.
177 Id.
178 Armstrong, supra note 13, at 342.
179 Id. at 343.
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subscribers. Nonetheless, Armstrong argues that the optimal mobile
termination rate is still less than the unregulated rate. In particular, he
argues that reducing the mobile termination charge below the unregulated
rate would increase the welfare of callers to mobile subscribers more than
it would decrease the welfare of mobile subscribers.
80
Armstrong's model, however, does not allow for any requirement that
variable charges defray some of the fixed costs of the MNO's operations.
As we demonstrate in the following section, mobile termination rates that
exceed marginal cost not only reflect network externalities, but also are
consistent with the Ramsey pricing required to defray fixed costs.
C. Termination Rates as Part of Ramsey (Quasi-Efficient) Pricing
MNOs must use some source of revenue to defray the large fixed
costs of building and operating mobile telecommunications networks, and
of attracting new customers. It is unrealistic to assume that these fixed
costs will be reflected in a customer charge for joining the network. Given
the unavoidability of these large fixed and common costs, how should
competitive MNOs set mobile termination rates?
Above-cost prices in the call termination segment of the mobile
services bundle are consistent with constrained economic efficiency if they
satisfy the Ramsey criterion. Ramsey pricing is a method of allocating
common costs to the individual products of a multiproduct firm. 181
Whereas economic welfare in a perfectly competitive market generally is
maximized by setting the price of each product equal to its marginal cost,
Ramsey pricing provides a solution to minimize welfare losses if marginal-
cost pricing yields revenues insufficient to cover the supplier's total costs.
In particular, the damage to welfare is minimized if the shortfall is covered
through smaller increases in the prices of goods whose demand is
comparatively price-elastic and larger increases in the prices of goods
whose demand is comparatively price-inelastic. Formally, Ramsey pricing
requires that, where goods are neither substitutes nor complements, the
percentage difference between the price of any good X and the marginal
cost of X should be inversely proportional to the own-price elasticity of
demand for X When two goods are substitutes, the Ramsey pricing rule is
stated in terms of superelasticities-that is, the optimal markup for good 1
is a function of both the elasticity of demand for good 1 and good 2-and
the price of good 1 should be adjusted upward to account for the fact that
such an increase raises the revenue received on good 2.182 When the goods
180 Id.
181 See supra note 161.
182 See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN
PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION 173 (1994); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Creating
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are complements, as in call origination and call termination, the price of
good 1 should be adjusted downward to account for the fact that such an
increase decreases the revenue received on good 2.183
Evidence indicates that mobile subscribers are less sensitive to the
price of call termination than the price of other parts of the mobile services
bundle, such as outgoing calls.18 4 Consequently, efficiency-enhancing
prices should be set so that common costs-which by definition are not
attributable to any particular service within the mobile services bundle-
are included in the price of the less demand-elastic service, call
termination. Mobile termination rates that exceed costs and yield excess
margins therefore would enhance efficiency if they keep the prices of other
services whose demand is very elastic closer to marginal costs.
Jerry Hausman demonstrates that the standard Ramsey solution to
recovering common costs in a quasi-efficient manner requires that both
mobile customers and their fixed-network callers pay variable charges that
exceed marginal cost. 85 After estimating the relevant demand elasticities,
he finds that customers on the originating end of the call should pay a
higher markup than the customers on the terminating end of the call. I8 6 He
rejects the alternative of a two-part tariff because regulators would not
likely require a fixed-line carrier to pay a fixed charge for the right to
make calls to a mobile network.8 7
Oftel rejected the Ramsey pricing justification for seemingly high
mobile termination rates because it found that the overall mobile services
market in the United Kingdom was not competitive. MNOs had no
incentive to set prices at a Ramsey-price level, Oftel said; rather, they had
incentives to set prices above that level. 88 Stated differently, Oftel argued
that, free of regulation, mobile termination rates would exceed their
Ramsey values because markets are not perfectly competitive. But, MNOs
cannot be expected to choose mobile termination rates that perfectly
accord with Ramsey pricing. Oftel is trying to regulate a highly
competitive market that is not perfectly competitive.
In an empirical study of fixed-to-mobile termination rates in the
United Kingdom, Drs. Christian Koboldt and Dan Maldoom of DotEcon
found that the socially optimal Ramsey prices diverge significantly from
the prices that would result from the application of Oftel's preferred "equi-
Competition through Interconnection: Theory and Practice, 10 J. REG. ECON. 227 (1996).
183 LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 182, at 173.
184 See OFTEL STUDY, supra note 23, at 5. This statement does not conflict with our earlier
point that mobile subscribers are also sensitive to the price of incoming calls and therefore constrain
the MNO's ability to raise mobile termination rates.
185 Hausman, supra note 2, at 596.
186 Id.
187 ld. § 8.25.
188 OFTEL STUDY, supra note 23, at 23, 81.
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proportionate mark-ups" ("EPMU").189 Koboldt and Maldoom argue that
competition among mobile operators must be assessed in terms of bundles
of services, which include subscription revenues, revenues from mobile-
originated calls, and call termination revenues. Ramsey markups above
long-run incremental cost ("LRIC") are derived by solving the following
optimization problem: Choose a vector of prices that maximizes social
welfare subject to the constraint that operating profits must exceed the
fixed cost of building and maintaining the mobile network. Koboldt and
Maldoom estimate demand elasticities for each of the three components of
the bundle of services. 190 Next, they obtain price, quantity, and cost
estimates for each component from Oftel reports. Using these inputs,
Koboldt and Maldoom estimate the following mean Ramsey markups for
each component: 7.9% for subscription, 48.1% for mobile-originated calls,
and 689.3% for fixed-to-mobile calls.' 91 They reject the hypothesis that the
Ramsey markups on all three components are equal. 192 They conclude that
"whatever the shortcomings of the current structure of charges, a move
toward setting charges for one particular service element-call
termination-at the level of LRIC + EPMU has the potential of resulting
in far worse outcomes."'
193
D. The Pitfalls of TELRIC-Style Regulation
The Telecommunications Act of 1996194 requires the FCC to
stimulate competition in local exchange services by creating a class of
carriers, known as competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs"), that are
entitled to preferential access to incumbents' facilities at below-market
rates. 195 In this section, we review the associated cost of this policy,
especially with respect to the misallocation of resources by the CLECs and
the investment community.
189 DOTECON OPTIMAL CHARGES STUDY, supra note 141, at 21.
190 Id. at 11-17.
191 Id. at21.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 24. For a similar critique of the FCC's recommendation for the use of
equiproportional markups above LRIC for the pricing of unbundled network elements, see J. GREGORY
SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE
CoMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES 339-41 (1997).
194 47U.S.C. § 251(c)(2004).
195 For an extended analysis of the economic effect of the unbundling provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, see Robert W. Crandall, Local and Long Distance Competition:
Replacing Regulation with Competition, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION AND FCC
REFORM: FINISHING THE JOB (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Randolph J. May eds., 2000); Robert W. Crandall
& J. Gregory Sidak, Is Structural Separation of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers Necessary for
Competition?, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 335 (2002); Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer
Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J.
417, 452-53 (1999); J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the
Collapse ofAmerican Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 207 (2003).
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The Telecommunications Act directed the FCC to identify network
facilities of ILECs that should be made available to entrants at regulated
wholesale rates. 96 The FCC liberally interpreted this mandate by ruling
that virtually every element of the ILECs' networks-from loops to
switches to interoffice transport-should be made available at forward-
looking, long-run average incremental costs ("LRAIC") to competitors.
197
Because this incremental-cost standard applied to each individual network
element, the FCC's costing methodology was dubbed TELRIC, or total
element long-run incremental cost.198 Moreover, the FCC determined that,
because TELRIC rates are based on the most efficient network imaginable,
TELRIC rates must be less than the actual historical costs of building and
maintaining the ILECs' networks. Why should entrants, the FCC reasoned,
be forced to pay higher access charges because of the ILECs' older
networks that are now inefficient, given the changes in technology that
have occurred since the ILECs built them?
TELRIC regulation was doomed to fail from the start. Solving for the
socially optimal access rate in theory is different from asking state
regulators to find the socially optimal access rate in practice. The latter
requires precise estimates of the marginal cost of providing each network
component required to deliver telephone service for a hypothetical most-
efficient carrier. Empirical estimates of actual incremental costs cannot
inform the solution and are difficult to obtain in practice. The search for
the most efficient network leads to insoluble questions over, among other
issues, the appropriate network design, the proper switching volumes, the
necessity to maintain capacity to serve peak calling periods, and the type
of switches used. Finally, the socially optimal access rate requires
estimates of a markup factor above marginal cost that allows the
incumbent carrier to contribute to fixed and common costs. Under a highly
politicized environment, regulators are expected to estimate these variables
with precision.
TELRIC rates vary enormously across states in areas of similar
density. Table 3 shows the average TELRIC rate for U.S. states with
available pricing data alongside the demographic and economic
characteristics of those states.
196 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2004) ("An incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such
unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in
order to provide such telecommunications service.").
197 Review of the Commission's Rules Regarding the Pricing of Unbundled Network
Elements and the Resale of Service by Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, WC Dkt. No. 03-173, 18
F.C.C.R. 18,945 18 (2003).
198 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of




Table 3: Demographic and Economic Characteristics and Weighted
Average "Loop" or "Access Loop" Rate in Selected U.S. States
Population 1999 Weighted
Density Average
Population (people/sq Degree of Wage Rate Access "Loop"
State (1,000s) mile) Urbanization Index Rate* ($)
AL 4,370 86.1 70.1 93.9 19.04
AZ 4,778 42.0 87.8 95.2 21.98
CT 3,282 677.4 95.6 112.5 12.49
DC 519 8,452.8 100.0 133.3 10.81
DE 754 385.4 81.6 117.0 12.05
GA 7,788 134.5 68.9 91.2 16.51
IA 2,869 51.4 44.6 101.4 8.20
ID 1,252 15.1 38.3 93.6 25.52
IL 12,128 218.2 84.5 100.4 9.81
IN 5,943 165.7 71.7 104.6 8.20
KS 2,654 32.4 56.4 98.6 14.04
KY 3,961 99.7 48.3 99.3 20.00
MA 6,175 787.9 96.1 107.7 14.98
MD 5,172 529.1 92.7 105.2 14.50
ME 1,253 40.6 35.8 96.7 17.53
MI 9,864 173.6 82.6 126.0 10.15
MN 4,776 60.0 70.1 109.3 17.87
MT 883 6.1 33.4 94.5 27.41
NC 7,651 157.0 67.1 92.1 16.71
NE 1,666 21.7 51.8 89.4 14.32
NH 1,201 133.9 60.2 96.9 17.99
NJ 8,143 1,097.6 100.0 109.1 16.17
NV 1,809 16.5 86.1 97.5 19.83
NY 18,197 385.3 91.9 101.3 14.81
OK 3,358 48.9 60.5 96.7 14.84
OR 3,316 34.5 72.7 106.1 15.00
PA 11,994 267.6 84.5 103.6 14.06
TN 5,484 133.0 67.8 90.2 18.00
TX 20,044 76.5 84.5 92.9 14.15
UT 2,130 25.9 76.7 91.2 20.00
VA 6,873 173.6 78.1 98.8 13.60
VT 594 64.2 27.9 101.0 14.41
WA 5,756 86.5 82.9 109.4 11.33
WI 5,250 96.7 67.8 105.9 10.90
WV 1,807 75.0 41.9 102.9 24.58
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AVERAGE 5,248 424.4 70.3 101.9 15.77
Sources: Average access rate from Billy Jack Gregg, A Survey of Unbundled Network Element Prices
in the United States (Spring 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal on Regula-
tion), available at http://www.sbc.com/Long_Distance/CA271/VandeloopAttachA.pdf; U.S. popu-
lation, pop. density, and degree of urbanization data from U.S. Census Bureau; Wage Rate Index from
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (Sept. 2000).
* Equal to the weighted average UNE rate across all density zones in a given state, where the weights
are equal to the share of the number of lines per density zone.
As Table 3 shows, certain states with very similar densities (Alabama
and Washington each have roughly eighty-six persons per square mile) can
have very different TELRIC rates ($19.04 versus $11.33 per month,
respectively). The large discrepancy in rates may reflect political factors
that are not captured in the demographic or economic data or simply large
errors in trying to estimate network costs.
The search for the socially optimal mobile termination rate is
similarly futile. It would begin by estimating the marginal cost of
terminating a fixed network call onto a mobile network. Unfortunately,
MNOs do not and probably cannot compute the precise marginal cost of an
incoming call, and such an estimate would vary across networks and over
time. Next, it would require an estimate of a markup to account for
network externalities. As Armstrong demonstrates, the network externality
effect depends on measures of (1) the change in the number of mobile
subscribers with respect to a change in the net surplus offered by mobile
networks, (2) the change in the net surplus offered by mobile networks
with respect to a change in the mobile termination rate, (3) the utility of
callers to mobiles, and (4) the change in the number of fixed-to-mobile
calls with respect to a change in the price of the mobile termination rate.199
It is unreasonable to expect that regulators could measure these inputs with
precision and then implement Armstrong's complex formula in an
unbiased manner. As with the TELRIC process in the United States,
regulators would be unable to determine the appropriate incremental cost
with any precision. Even worse, regulators might attempt to skew the rate
toward their favored constituency.200 Of course, to the extent that mobile
customers care about the welfare of their callers, the unregulated rate will
be competed down to the socially optimal rate, and the entire exercise
would be a waste of social resources.
199 Armstrong, supra note 13, at 342.
200 Indeed, Sidak and Spulber argue that the FCC's UINE pricing reflects reverse Ramsey





Mobile termination rates cannot be equal to marginal cost because
such an equality would prevent an MNO from recovering the high fixed
costs of building and maintaining its network. In addition to the nature of
costs, the demand for mobile telecommunications exhibits network
externalities, which also imply that mobile termination rates properly
exceed marginal cost. This need to depart from marginal-cost pricing of
mobile termination exemplifies the theory of Ramsey pricing. In addition
to these theoretical considerations, the practical difficulties with TELRIC
price regulation of unbundled network elements since 1996 suggests how
hard it would be for regulators to set mobile termination rates that would
be socially optimal.
IV. The Lower Social Cost of Market-Based Solutions
Economists typically scrutinize public policies according to the
Pareto criterion-a proposed policy should be rejected if another policy
exists such that welfare for every consumer under the alternative is greater
than under the proposed policy.1 Put differently, a Pareto-superior public
policy will make at least one person better off without making anyone else
worse off. Because of theoretical and practical problems that plague cost-
based price regulation, we suggest several solutions to the problem of high
fixed-to-mobile termination rates that do not involve price regulation.
A number of market-based solutions impose lower social costs by
increasing competitive pressures on the MNOs from both calling parties
and from the MNOs' own mobile subscribers. Regulators could encourage
demand substitution by providing callers on fixed networks with more
information about the particular network they call and the relevant
termination rate. Providing mobile network subscribers with information
about the prices of incoming calls would enable them to consider those
prices when making calling choices. Shortening the contracts for mobile
subscribers would facilitate switching networks in response to increases of
termination rates.
A. Mandatory Disclosure of Termination Rates to Customers of Fixed
Networks,
The consumer reaction to an increase in the price of calling a
particular network depends on whether calling parties recognize the
identity of the mobile network that they are calling and the associated
201 See, e.g., DAVID M. KREPs, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 153 (1990).
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price. If consumers have this information, their choices would reveal the
own-price elasticity of demand for fixed-to-mobile calls. On the other
hand, if calling parties lack that particular information, they will base their
decisions on their information about the market average price for making
fixed-to-mobile calls-that is, the average price across all MNOs in the
relevant market. The elasticity of demand faced by any particular firm is
greater (in absolute terms) than the elasticity of demand for the entire
market. Knowledge of an MNO's fixed-to-mobile termination rates would
increase further the demand elasticity (in absolute terms) for calls to that
network above the market elasticity. If termination rates are averaged, any
increase in termination rates by one MNO would increase the average
price by only a small share of the particular price increase. In addition, any
overall decline in incoming call volume would affect all MNOs and not
merely the MNO that had raised its price, thus spreading the demand-
dampening effect across all networks. For this reason, consumer
termination rates should reflect the individual MNO's termination charges.
A simple way for the fixed-network operator to inform its customers
of fixed-to-mobile termination rates is to list the set of relevant prices on
its customers' monthly telephone bills.20 2 Suppose that ninety percent of
domestic fixed-to-mobile calls by customers of a fixed-network operator
were terminated onto four mobile networks. The fixed-network operator
easily could provide the fixed-to-mobile termination rates for each of the
four mobile networks on its customers' bills. Once he knows these prices,
a customer of the fixed network could make an informed decision on
whether to call subscribers of each of the four MNOs. If fixed-network
operators are not providing information on these fixed-to-mobile
termination rates to their customers, regulators may have to mandate such
disclosure.
B. Imposition of Dedicated Number Prefixes for Mobile Operators
One obvious way for the fixed-line subscriber to identify the MNO
terminating his call is to use dedicated number prefixes. For example, U.S.
regulators require adult phone services to use designated prefixes so that
customers will anticipate the charges. Mobile-to-mobile number
portability, however, undermines this solution by severing the link
between the identity of the MINO and the prefix.20 3 If ordered by
202 For example, SBC Communications lists foreign mobile termination rates on its website.
SBC Communications, International Mobile Termination Charge, at
http://www02.sbc.com/ProductsServices/Residential/1,,70-1-1-0,00.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
203 The FCC ordered mobile-to-mobile number portability in February 2002 but granted the
MNOs over one year to implement the rules. See In re Telephone Number Portability, Memorandum
Opinion and Order on Reconsideration and Order on Application for Review, CC Dkt. No. 95-116, 17
F.C.C.R. 2,578 1 (2002).
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regulators, fixed-to-mobile number portability would exacerbate this
destruction of the identifying characteristic of numbering blocks. Hence,
although number portability serves to constrain market power that any
MNO has vis-A-vis its own customer, this policy has the unintended
consequence of eliminating an easy potential solution to high mobile
termination rates.
C. Mandatory Disclosure of Termination Rates to Mobile Customers
Upon Activation of Account
One reason why mobile subscribers in CPP countries currently do not
choose mobile networks based on the price of incoming fixed-to-mobile
calls is that they lack information about the prices of such calls when they
activate their mobile accounts. Even after activation of a mobile account,
an MNO does not provide the fixed-to-mobile termination rate on the
mobile customer's bill in CPP countries. Instead, those prices are
presented to the fixed-network operator and passed on to its subscribers.2 °4
It would require very little for each MNO to print its fixed-to-mobile
termination rate on its monthly invoice to each of its mobile subscribers.
More to the point, it would require very little for a fixed-line operator to
print on its monthly invoices the fixed-to-mobile termination rates charged
by the four or five MNOs that terminate the largest volume of traffic going
from that fixed-line operator to CPP countries.
As fixed-to-mobile callers become informed of the prices for mobile
termination through mandatory disclosure of termination rates, they will
express their preferences to their intended call recipients, who in turn will
express their preferences to MNOs. No one wants to subscribe to a mobile
network that is prohibitively costly to call from a fixed network. The effect
of this communication between the two user groups is for mobile
subscribers to internalize more fully the welfare of their fixed-network
callers, which, as we have argued, obviates regulation entirely.
D. Elimination of Regulation of Mobile-to-Fixed Termination Rates
Another deregulatory solution to the problem of high fixed-to-mobile
termination rates is to allow the fixed-line network operator to negotiate its
termination rates with the MNOs. As Julian Wright explains, "As long as
the firms' bargaining power is roughly balanced, the tendency for cellular
firms to set high termination charges may be alleviated.,
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confirms this view. In their seminal analysis of access pricing for rival
networks, Professors Jean-Jacques Laffont of the University of Toulouse
and Jean Tirole of the Institut d'Economie Industrielle have developed a
model of two-way access pricing for telecommunications networks.
2 0 6
Consumers first determine which of two networks to join, and, conditional
on that choice, they choose their variable telephone consumption. To
simplify their analysis, Laffont and Tirole assume that each network
charges a per-minute access rate (reciprocal access pricing), and the
fraction of calls originating on the first network that terminates on the
second network is proportional to the second network's market share.
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Laffont and Tirole argue that high termination charges create a strong
incentive for operators to increase their market shares to reduce their
average marginal cost of producing calls, which is a weighted average of
the marginal cost of completing a call on-net and off-net. In addition, they
explain that higher access charges induce networks to raise their retail
prices, which implies that the access charge might be an instrument for
tacit collusion. 8 In the presence of any one of four conditions, however,
access charges will not provide a mechanism for facilitating collusion: (1)
an imbalance in market shares, which creates a temptation for the high-
market-share network to charge low prices to avoid paying high access
rates; (2) nonlinear pricing, which allows networks to use a monthly
subscriber charge to build market share without inflating their off-net calls;
(3) roaming charges, which also allow the networks to build market share
without incurring access deficits; and (4) call-receiver subsidies, which
allow the call receiver to internalize the benefits to the network of
terminating the call.20 9
In addition, if the share of outgoing to incoming calls varies
significantly across subscribers, carriers will attempt to attract customers
who receive a large number of calls, thereby diminishing the appeal of
high terminating access charges to the other carrier. This form of arbitrage
defeated attempts by U.S. fixed-line carriers to negotiate high reciprocal
access charges because it allowed the new competitive fixed-line entrants
to target Internet service providers ("ISPs"), who have an extreme
imbalance of incoming calls, as subscribers.
If any of these four conditions listed by Laffont and Tirole is satisfied,
competition among networks forces access charges towards marginal cost.
Moreover, in the presence of joint and common costs, the socially optimal
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access rate might exceed the marginal cost of terminating a call.2 1° Since
joint and common costs are significant in mobile networks, and nonlinear
pricing is standard in the wireless industry, economic theory suggests that
when networks are free to negotiate access prices, the resulting mobile
termination rate will not deviate significantly from the socially optimal
access price.
Finally, empirical evidence in the United States implies that voluntary
negotiation among network operators leads to low termination rates. In the
United States, MNOs may freely negotiate reciprocal termination rates
with fixed-network operators and with other MNOs. As a result, fixed-to-
mobile termination rates roughly equal mobile-to-mobile termination
rates.21 1 In contrast, European fixed-network operators must accept
incoming mobile calls at a regulated (and very low) rate. Table 4 shows
the large disparity between mobile-to-fixed termination rates and fixed-to-
mobile termination rates as of 2000 for the thirteen developed countries in
our sample.
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Table 4: Fixed-to-Mobile Termination Rates and Mobile-to-Fixed
Termination Rates by Country, 1999-2000 ($/Minute)
1999 2000
Fixed-to- Mobile-to- Fixed-to- Mobile-to-
Mobile Fixed Mobile Fixed
Termination Termination Termination Termination
Rate Rate Ratio Rate Rate Ratio
Country (A) (B) (A) / (B) (A) (B) (A) / (B)
CPP
Austria 0.225 0.019 11.6 0.230 0.017 13.5
Denmark 0.170 0.019 9.0 0.170 0.008 21.3
Finland 0.187 0.018 10.5 0.210 0.013 16.2
France 0.329 0.019 17.1 0.200 0.006 33.3
Germany* 0.354 0.014 25.3 0.240 0.008 30.0
Italy 0.289 0.030 9.8 0.230 0.009 25.6
Mexico 0.115 0.030 6.7 0.403 0.026 7.7
Netherlands 0.345 0.017 20.4 0.180 0.009 20.0
Sweden 0.256 0.012 21.9 0.220 0.008 27.5
United Kingdom 0.204 0.009 23.2 0.160 0.005 32.0
Average 15.5 22.7
MPP
Canada NA NA NA NA 0.007 0.0
Hong Kong NA NA NA 0.008 0.008 1.0
United States** 0.023 0.023 1.0 0.020 0.020 1.0
Average 1.0 1.0
Sources: For 1999 rates, see MOBILE PRICING STRUCTURES, supra note 159, at 85 tbl. 16 (May 16,
2000). For 2000 rates, see ROHAN SAMARAJIVA & WILLIAM H. MELODY, INT'L TELECOMMS. UNION,
FIXED-MOBILE INTERCONNECTION WORKSHOP BRIEFING PAPER 11 fig.5, 13 fig.6 (Sept. 14, 2000),
available at http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ni/fini/workshop/FMIBriefing_Finall.doc. For rates from
Mexico, see OECD, MOBILE CELLULAR PRICING AND TRENDS, MEXICO CASE STUDY (April 2000),
available at http://www.itu.int/osg/sec/spu/ni/fmi/casestudies/index.html.
* MTRs are not regulated in Germany.
** 0.023 represents an average of the rates charged in the United States, according to the OECD table.
As of February 2003, the mobile termination rate in the United States had decreased to $0.005. See
FCC Eighth Annual Report, supra note 19, 1207.
As Table 4 shows, the differences in fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-
fixed termination rates among CPP countries greatly exceed the
differences in those rates in MPP countries. In 1999, the average ratio of
fixed-to-mobile termination rate to mobile-to-fixed termination rate across
all CPP countries in Table 4 was 15.5; it increased to 22.7 in 2000. In
contrast, the average ratio of fixed-to-mobile termination rate to mobile-to-
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fixed termination rate across MPP countries in our sample for which data
were available remained constant at 1.0 from 1999 to 2000.
Regulators have deprived European fixed-network operators of any
countervailing bargaining power vis-A-vis MNOs in setting termination
rates, and it is not surprising that European MNOs respond rationally by
exploiting this regulatory asymmetry. TeleGeography, a
telecommunications consultancy, has noted this asymmetric regulation of
fixed and mobile networks in its 2001 study of international mobile traffic:
Regulators in more developed economies, particularly Europe, have
focused more on the market power of fixed line operators, requiring
those with significant market power (SMP) to offer mobile operators
access [to] their networks at cost-based prices. Unsaddled by regulatory
constraints, mobile operators have, in turn, been able to charge fixed-line
operators access fees well above the fixed-mobile interconnection rate.
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Ironically, the European approach is to eliminate asymmetric
regulation by piling regulation on competitive carriers. The regulation of
mobile-to-fixed termination rates has thus preordained the regulation of
fixed-to-mobile termination rates. Rather than layer one form of price
regulation on another, regulators in CPP countries should create regulatory
parity by deregulating fixed-line operators insofar as their access
negotiations with MNOs are concerned.
V. Conclusion
MPP is the better option for pricing mobile calls because it aligns the
incentives of MNOs and mobile customers, thereby reducing the total cost
of using a mobile phone. The experience in the United States and Canada
demonstrates that MPP leads to greater use of mobile phones and lower
mobile prices. Although mobile penetration in MPP countries was less
than the penetration rates in CPP countries in 2003, the growth of mobile
penetration in MPP countries suggests that the "penetration gap" will
quickly vanish. In the United States, fixed-to-mobile termination rates are
not only low but also are roughly equal to mobile-to-fixed termination
rates because reciprocal compensation arrangements are permitted.
If regulators are not willing to embrace MPP, then CPP without price
regulation is a second-best solution. In particular, MNOs would have
incentives to lower mobile termination rates if CPP were combined with
(1) mandatory disclosure of termination rates to customers of fixed
networks at the time a call is placed; (2) imposition of dedicated number
prefixes for MNOs (which is mutually exclusive with number portability);
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(3) mandatory disclosure of termination rates to a mobile customer upon
activation of his account and on his monthly bill; and (4) elimination of
mobile-to-fixed termination rate regulation in favor of negotiation between
fixed and mobile operators.
The belief on the part of some NRAs that a reasonable termination rate
must equal the marginal cost of termination ignores the significant role of
fixed and common costs in a mobile network. The measurement problems,
perverse incentives for investment, and strategic behavior that have
accompanied the use of TELRIC pricing of unbundled network elements
in the United States give no reason to believe that regulated, TELRIC-
based rates would be more accurate, more efficient, and less contentious in
the context of mobile termination. Similarly, the belief that a reasonable
markup over marginal cost for termination must equal the markup over
marginal cost for all other services rests on incorrect economic analysis.
With the appropriate market design, there is a good chance that MNOs
acting in their own interests, or negotiating with fixed operators, will select
the socially optimal fixed-to-mobile termination rate.


